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BEYOND CULTURE
INTRODUCTION
The topic of "culture" and its influence on and interaction with law,
politics, and gender has been a preoccupation of many scholars for decades, if
not centuries. Particularly in those countries that have experienced waves of
immigration from various parts of the globe, questions of assimilation, culture,
and identity have been a perennial source of concern and inquiry. In the United
States, where the dominant culture has been a product of European immigration,
notions of race and national origin have shaped the question of citizenship and
belonging, often playing a critical role in the granting or withholding of rights.
Indeed, certain kinds of racial and cultural difference were deemed so immutable
and so unassimilable that they led not only to the denial of citizenship, but also
to the stripping of citizenship from those to whom it had been granted.'
Furthermore, religious difference also played a role in the ongoing attempts by
the federal government to regulate minority religions, as is starkly evident in the
2
ongoing regulation of Mormon polygamy.
Today, one would be hard-pressed to find a Supreme Court opinion baldly
expressing the kind of cultural and religious supremacy articulated by the 1878
Reynolds Court when it claimed that polygamy was a feature of "Asiatic and
1. See United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 214-15 (1923) (canceling a certificate of
citizenship on the grounds that the Indian applicant did not qualify as "white" as that term is
"popularly understood"); see also IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 56-77 (2006) (describing the evolution of race in the law by
exploring early cases granting or denying citizenship based on racial classifications).
2. For instance, from the mid-I 800s to the early 1900s, the federal government repeatedly
passed legislation aimed at the prevention of polygamy by Mormons. See, e.g., SARAH
BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFLICT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2002) (documenting the regulation of polygamy
at the federal level). In Supreme Court cases challenging these laws and arguing that they
violated the First Amendment, the Court made plain that polygamy is not a culturally or
religiously acceptable practice in a civilized nation in which democratic principles governed:
Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of
Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively
a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people. At common law, the second
marriage was always void..., and from the earliest history of England, polygamy
has been treated as an offence against society .... [P]olygamy leads to the
patriarchal principle, and which, when applied to large communities, fetters the
people in stationary despotism, while that principle cannot long exist in connection
with monogamy.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164-66 (1878). In one broad sweep, the Court in
Reynolds jettisoned the practice of Mormon polygamy from the dominant culture, politics,
and religion of the United States. Tying it to patriarchal, despotic Asians and Africans, the
Court asserted that its practice in the United States threatened the very foundations of the
social contract. See id. at 164. Furthermore, as Sarah Barringer Gordon argues, much of the
public outcry and subsequent justifications for legal regulation of Mormon polygamy was
based on the need to protect women and girls from the depredations of Mormon men-a
justification that has been revived and used in the War on Terror. See Sarah Barringer
Gordon, A War of Words: Revelation and Storytelling in the Campaign Against Mormon
Polygamy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 739, 765 (2003).
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African people." 3 In fact, a recent case dealing with de facto polygamy in Utah
cites Edward Said's Orientalism at length4  something the Reynolds court was
engaged in, but of which it was entirely unaware. In the United States, concepts
of equal protection and religious freedom have progressed in the past century.
From a period in which assimilation was simply expected and accommodation of
difference was not considered needful let alone legally required, we moved
rather rapidly to the 1980s and 1990s-a period in which multiculturalism and
tolerance became the bywords of liberal society. Dominant culture and religion
enshrined in public practices were challenged through cases brought against
state-directed school prayer, 5 against public displays of religion in government
buildings, 6 and in support of accommodation of minority religions. 7 But
questions about how much difference ought to be allowed and what kind of
accommodations would be required remained, and their limits continued to be
unresolved. Even while the dominant religion and culture were being questioned
from the 1970s to the 1990s, racial inclusion and diversity were facing their own
challenges. The more recent trend has been a swing back in the direction of an
assimilationist approach, as articulated by the Reynolds Court in the mid-1800s.
8
The concept of culture that prevailed during much of US history was largely
untouched in the law until the latter part of the twentieth century, and the brief
heyday of multiculturalism now appears to be over.
For feminists of any persuasion, the question of difference and culture has
been a particularly vexing feature of the US women's movement from its very
inception. The critiques raised by black women, which consistently point to
problems of white universalism and hegemony, follow the history of dominant
liberal feminist movements almost like a shadow. 9 Black feminism, critical race
feminism, postcolonial feminism, and even religious feminism have staked out
epistemological authority and ground in the last three decades, demanding
inclusion in feminist debates and questioning dominant liberal feminist
representations. 1 0 Thus, as debates were going on about multiculturalism, the
3. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
4. See Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1182 (D. Utah 2013).
5. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that government-directed prayer in
public schools violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment).
6. See, e.g., McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005)
(holding that a preliminary injunction prohibiting the display of the Ten Commandments in a
courthouse was adequately supported by evidence that the display violated the Establishment
Clause).
7. See, e.g., Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (finding that a prayer
opening town board meetings did not have to be nonsectarian to comply with the
Establishment Clause).
8. See supra note 2 (discussing cultural assimilation in the context of Mormon polygamy).
9. See, e.g., CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2d ed. 2003)
(offering a range of critiques of dominant liberal feminism and its erasing of race from
women's experiences).
10. See Karen Knop et al., From Multiculturalism to Technique: Feminism, Culture, and the
Conflict of Laws Style, 64 STAN. L. REV. 589, 609 (2012) ("[C]hanging conceptions of
culture have made it more difficult for feminists to keep their bearings in the
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very concept of "women" as the subject of feminism was also being
interrogated. "
With the acceleration of globalization in the 1990s, feminists from the
Global South were pushing back against the generalizations of feminists in the
Global North. 12 The politics of representation, both of gender and culture in their
essentialist, reified forms, became a seemingly Gordian knot from which there
was no escape. Feminists worldwide needed to stake out some normative
positions shared between different strains of feminism-some set of universal
goals that transcended cultural difference. But at the same time, difference
became an important category of analysis within feminism, with postcolonial,
queer, and critical race feminists resisting heterosexual, white, liberal feminist
universals increasingly expressed in human rights idioms. 13 And in turn,
postcolonial and critical race feminists were charged with cultural relativism. 14
Both sides used culture as the culprit for women's subordination albeit at the
hands of different oppressors. 15 While significant work has been done to bridge
the oppositional way that culture and feminism have been positioned, culture
continues to be used by some feminists to articulate the subordination of
minority women as well as by some minorities as a shield to demand protection
from assimilation. 16
Internationally, as the domestic debates were unfolding, these decades saw
transnational movements for human rights grow and replace socialist and
nationalist movements. 17 Human rights universalism, very much like feminist
universalism, had to contend with particularity in societal structure and cultural
practices on the ground. Abstract ideas in the theoretical realm fractured on the
practical differences in each locale. As such, the explanation for the lack of
progress in human rights protection and gender justice was laid at the doorstep of
feminism/culture debate. The normative clarity of those who frame the conflict as equality
versus culture is met with layer upon layer of cultural complication.").
11. See, e.g., DENISE RILEY, AM I THAT NAME?: FEMINISM AND THE CATEGORY OF "WOMEN"
IN HISTORY (2002) (discussing the social construction of the category of "women" and the
problem this poses for feminism).
12. See, e.g., INDERPAL GREWAL, TRANSNATIONAL AMERICA: FEMINISMS, DIASPORAS,
NEOLIBERALISMS 136-38 (2005) (discussing feminist critiques of universalizing "women's
rights" from the perspective of rich Northern countries).
13. See Martha Minow, About Women, About Culture: About Them, About Us, 129 DAEDALUS
125, 130 (2000) ("Culture defenders [argue] that Western liberals wrongly criticize other
cultures for gender oppression and other injustices while neglecting the form such oppression
takes in their own culture."); see also id. at 134-35 (listing the iterations of the normative
challenges to liberal feminists from culture defenders).
14. See Azizah Y. al-Hibri, Is Western Patriarchal Feminism Good for Third World/Minority
Women?, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999)
(presenting a range of essays that debate the effect of multiculturalism and accommodation
of cultural difference on women's rights).
15. See Knop et al., supra note 10, at 600-01 (describing how both sides of the culture debate
view the other side as perpetuating female subordination).
16. See id at 597-98 (explaining the tension between equality concerns and self-determination
by minority groups).
17. See SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 2-3 (2010).
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culture. But what is meant by "culture," and how do we know what to do about it
when it becomes oppressive?
Culture appears so often in conversations about women's status and the
law that it has become a go-to explanation for any manner of event or belief.
Culture has at times encompassed both religion and ethnicity to provide a sort of
umbrella term. But just as most generalizations have limited explanatory power
when used in this way, culture is a similarly thin concept. It fails to shed light on
how certain choices about the law and society's priorities are made, or on who
holds the power to decide. As such, when culture is used as a rationale for legal
or political decisions, it requires careful unpacking and scrutiny. It also requires
skepticism. While cultural defenses are often alibis for political choices and
distributions, the use of culture as a justification for intervention must also be
treated with skepticism. And here, dominant human rights feminism must come
to terms with its own complicity in the use of "cultural" gender subordination as
justification for the extinction of those illiberal cultures. Furthermore, it is
important to note that the local and the global often become elided when
speaking of culture and religion insofar as the problem of liberal rights versus
culture is theorized from the perspective of liberal, multicultural societies in the
Global North. In order to bridge the divide between feminism and culture, we
must pay attention to context: feminists challenging cultural accommodation
within a liberal democratic state cannot assume that the same strategies will
work globally, even if they are certain that their normative commitments are
ones worth fighting for.
This Article explores the tensions, cleavages, and possible reconciliations
between and within feminism and religion/culture. It proceeds in four parts:
first, culture and its religion are often used as a justification for avoiding gender
law reform. However, what is often hidden behind such usage is a highly
particular and discreet set of political choices about how to arrange the rights and
obligations within society. These choices are not determined a priori by a
cultural script, but rather are arrived at through a political process of setting
priorities. While postcolonial and critical race feminists have resisted attacks
based on culture by white feminists, they have also had to articulate and fight for
change against dominant cultural norms within their communities. It is an
uncomfortable position to defend one's "cultural" group from denigration from
outsiders on one hand while critiquing the very same use of culture from within.
In this Section, the Article suggests that the best way to overcome the power of
the cultural sword and shield and to effect change is through a politics of
solidarity--one in which feminists come together to engage in unflinching
18. Although there are critical differences in culture and religion, they are coupled here because,
when discussing Islam and Muslims, they have become increasingly entangled and
sometimes interchangeable. While such entanglements need to be resisted and examined, the
project of this Article is to look at neutral universalism on one side and religion and culture
on the other. One might say that I am exploring religion and culture as the "Other" of
universal rights that are purported to be devoid of culture or religion.
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critique from positions of equality rather than civilizational superiority.
Second, those who justify doing little or nothing by way of gender law
reform as well as those who seek sweeping reforms demanding radical
assimilation (whether into the dominant culture or into the international legal
human rights norms) view "culture" very similarly. That is, they take as given
the bounded, unchanging, and settled nature of culture and understate or ignore
altogether the contestations within cultural groups. Moreover, they do not
interrogate the authority of those who purport to speak for the group, or
challenge the right to represent and shape culture. This mirroring of relativists
and universalists is an old construction that has roots in the colonial period. This
history is important in understanding the present dilemmas of feminism.' 9 In this
Section, the Article will explore some of the arguments that culture should be
viewed as more fluid in order to assess whether this approach can be more useful
to feminists in achieving gender justice.
Third, the mirrored understanding of culture as a static set of practices,
beliefs, and identities also results in a seemingly intractable oppositional tension
between traditionalists/relativists who seek to preserve culture and the
universalists who seek to overcome it. This tension is very present in legal
feminist thought, where practical legal tradeoffs between competing rights
claims seem inevitable, as well as in feminist activism, making transnational
coalitions and support more complicated. While it is impossible to fully map that
tension as it manifests in the literature or in its negative effects on feminist
activism and agenda-setting, this Article does examine two situations in which it
can be clearly observed: the veil controversy in France and the recent activism
by FEMEN to "free" Muslim women from Islam. By grounding the theoretical
observations in these two phenomena, the Article hopes to show more clearly the
maddening nature of the impasse and make the argument that, unless the impasse
is overcome, the full potential of emancipatory feminist thought and activism
will never be realized.
Fourth, in this era during which the War on Terror continues to be
prosecuted in ever-expanding locations across the globe, culture and civilization
have been resuscitated as justifications for intervention and violence for the sake
21of human rights. We are all too familiar now with the misleading use of
women's rights as justifications for the use of force in Afghanistan. 22 In Iraq,
19. See, e.g., MARY DALY, GYN/ECOLOGY: THE METAETHICS OF RADICAL FEMINISM 153-77
(1978) (discussing the modem day feminist dilemmas presented by cultural practices such as
female genital cutting).
20. See Kimberly Younce Schooley, Cultural Sovereignty, Islam, and Human Rights-Toward A
Communitarian Revision, 25 CUMB. L. REv. 651, 678-79 (1995) (comparing various forms
of cultural relativism with universalist ideals).
21. See David A. Bosworth, American Crusade: The Religious Roots of the War on Terror, 7
BARRY L. REv. 65, 103-04 (2006) (discussing American imperialism in the context of the
War on Terror).
22. Cyra Akila Choudhury, Empowerment or Estrangement?: Liberal Feminism's Visions of the
"Progress" of Muslim Women, 39 U. BALT. L. FORUM 153, 153 (2009).
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while gender repression was less present, Saddam Hussein's human rights
violations against the Kurds, the Shi'a, and dissenters, together with the alleged
existence of weapons of mass destruction, provided the justification for the
invasion.2 3 Given the uses to which culture has been put by women's rights and
human rights hawks, it is important to interrogate their representation of both the
cause for intervention (culture and gender subordination) and its goals
(promotion of democracy and human rights). The final part of the Article
grapples with some of the difficulties of feminist human rights universalism and
considers how feminists can retain their political agendas without becoming
myrmidons in support of imperialist and repressive state action. In this endeavor,
postcolonial feminists, critical race feminists, and liberal feminists must come to
terms with the problematic uses of culture and universalism in the current global
context, clarify the goals of their feminisms, articulate the common ground and
epistemological equality among them in order to build true solidarity, and move
beyond the burdens of culture and the hegemony of falsely neutral liberal rights
elevated to the universal.
I. CULTURE AS AN ALIBI: POLITICS, LAW, AND CHOICES REGARDING
GENDER LAW REFORM
Feminists have long had to contend with arguments against law and rights
reform based on culture. 24 The literature in almost every feminist field is replete
with examples of culture used to push back on claims of equality and rights.
25
Basing their arguments on tradition (a respect for past practice) and religion
(adherence to divine commandments), those who wish to retain the status quo
that subordinates women and sexual minorities give the impression that change
is undesirable, dangerous, or impossible.
2 6
This Section interrogates the use of culture as an alibi for preventing
reform and contrasts this approach with feminist calls for contextual analysis. In
23. See J.M. Spectar, Beyond the Rubicon: Presidential Leadership, International Law & the
Use of Force in the Long Hard Slog, 22 CONN. J. INT'L L. 47, 53 (2006) ("Al Qaeda's plans
to obtain weapons of mass destruction as well as their record of effectuating mass civilian
casualties strengthened [President] Bush's ability to paint a clear case of good against evil.").
24. See generally IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?, supra note 14 (presenting a range
of essays that debate the effect of multiculturalism and accommodation of cultural difference
on women's rights).
25. See, e.g., Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense",
17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1994) (discussing contexts in which criminal defendants have
used culture to explain or excuse their behavior); KimberI Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 1241, 1257 (1991) (explaining how cultural factors further isolate domestic violence
survivors in minority communities).
26. See Cyra Akila Choudhury, (Mis)Appropriated Liberty: Identity, Gender Justice, and Muslim
Personal Law Reform in India, 14 COLUM. J. OF GENDER & L. 45, 93-97 (2008); Leti Volpp,
Migrating Identities: On Labor, Culture, and Law, 27 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 507,
511-13 (2002) ("Specific cases of abuse are conceptualized not as reflecting the behavior of
a few individuals, but are thought to characterize the cultures of entire nations.").
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the first instance, states and those who wield authority in both society and
politics argue that adherence to culture or religion bars certain forms of gender
law reform.27 These "traditionalists" assume the power to determine which
interpretations of culture and religion will be given state preference in a manner
that almost occludes the very existence of multiple competing readings and
interpretations of culture. 28 Moreover, they tend to rely on textual and highly
formal conceptions of culture, religion, and law, ignoring the normative
messiness that actually exists in people's communal lives. Most feminists, on the
other hand, have made it a part of their method to theorize from the ground up.
As such, women's lived experience provides much useful raw material to the
kinds of reform proposals that some feminists make. 29 Calls for contextual
analysis made most often by minority women embedded in a majority-dominant
culture, or made by women in the Global South to transnational partners in the
North, are not deploying a cultural defense in the same way that traditionalists
do. Rather they are articulating that there may be different ways of "being" a
woman than the essentialized variant presupposed by many liberal feminists.
30
Moreover, women may want very different things that make no sense to
feminists situated differently. But respect for autonomy-no matter how
problematic the concept-requires feminists to consider these demands seriously
on their own terms and not as forms of false consciousness. Requests for nuance,
anti-essentialism, and even cultural or religious sensitivity, then, are not merely a
defense of culture, but also a call to attend to the express desires of women and
their articulations of freedom and thriving even if we disagree. Surely, this is
better than imposing a version of freedom that does not resonate or patronizing
women who wish to live differently. These demands may be as much about
authority and the distribution of power among women as they are about minority
rights and accommodation.
A. Traditionalists: Protecting "Culture" over Women
Domestic claims to cultural protection are often made when women
27. See infra notes 33-52 and accompanying text. Martha Fineman suggests that culture changes
very slowly even if it is not immutable. Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law:
The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3-4 (1992) ("Culture and society are
not easily manipulated and change occurs slowly if at all. Even what appears to be progress
is often the superficial adjustment of institutions undertaken to maintain old hierarchies in
the face of challenges.").
28. See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, The Return of the Repressed- Illiberal Groups in a Liberal
State, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 897, 898 (2002) ("in the name of state neutrality and
individual freedom of choice, subcultures are pushed out of the public realm of law and
politics, denied the powers of (self-)governance, and restricted to a private realm of strictly
voluntary association and individual confessions of faith.").
29. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 157-
234 (1991) (deriving a theory of state from the lived experiences of women's sexual
subordination, including rape, abortion, and pornography).
30. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Taming of the Shrew: The Liberal Attempt to Mainstream
Radical Feminist Theory, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 123, 175 (1992).
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demand changes to family law, inheritance, and other discriminatory
regulations.3' While culture is rarely invoked in US jurisprudence, tradition
plays a very large role in the constitutional analysis of fundamental rights and in
the weighing of calls for reform. 32 Cultural arguments to prevent gender law
reform continue to hold salience even though they are not understood to be
"cultural" as such. For instance, in the 1873 case Bradwell v. Illinois, the
stereotypes of womanhood were used to deny a female applicant admittance to
the bar.33 In that case, the Supreme Court opined that:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is,
or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity
and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of
the occupations of civil life. The Constitution of the family organization, which
is founded in the divine ordinance as well as in the nature of things, indicates
the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and
functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interest and
views which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to
the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of
her husband. 34
The stereotypes prevalent in this reasoning reveal a culture of male
dominance and the segregation of women into separate spheres, a culture that
demands women's submission to male authority within the family and their
adherence to forms of behavior that conform to expected female roles of wife
and mother. Moreover, these biological roles are essentialized to make women
unfit for other occupations. Unfortunately, women continue to struggle with
these cultural constraints. Although feminists have made large strides in
equalizing the opportunities for men and women, and in challenging the
stereotypes that prevent women from achieving full equality and justice, the
prevailing culture remains patriarchal.35 In addition to this, American culture
31. See infra notes 33-52 and accompanying text. See, e.g., KimberId Williams Crenshaw, Race,
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination
Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1345 (1988) (discussing the impact of culture on
discrimination law).
32. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding that the asserted right to
commit suicide, which itself includes the right to assistance in doing so, has no place in the
nation's traditions for the purposes of substantive due process analysis; consistent and almost
universal tradition has long rejected the asserted right, and continues to reject it explicitly
today, even for terminally ill, mentally competent adults).
33. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
34. Id. at 141. The use of generalizations and stereotypes has been eroded by ongoing
constitutional challenges, the most significant of these being United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515 (1996) (holding the Virginia Military Institute's gender-based admission policy
unconstitutional because it treated women unequally based on stereotypes).
35. See Knop et al., supra note 10, at 597.
BEYOND CULTURE
remains resolutely racist.36 For minority women then, the dominant culture and
the role of white women in maintaining parts of it make solidarity particularly
difficult. In a relatively recent article in Time, the author of a book that claims
the rise of women is rendering men infants makes the following claim:
After decades of antidiscrimination laws, diversity initiatives and feminist
advocacy, such [gender inequality] data leads to an uncomfortable question:
Do women actually want equality? The answer seems transparently,
blindingly, obvious. Do women want to breathe fresh air? Do they want to
avoid rattlesnakes and fatal heart attacks?
But from another perspective, the answer is anything but clear. In fact, there's
good reason to think that women don't want the sort of equality envisioned by
government bureaucrats, academics and many feminist advocates, one
imagined strictly by the numbers with the goal of a 50-50 breakdown of men
and women in C-suites, law-school dean offices, editorial boards and
computer-science departments; equal earnings, equal work hours, equal assets,
equal time changing diapers and doing the laundry.
37
And the voice of one of the most enduring anti-feminist traditionalists,
hearkening back to Bradwell, reminds us all that there are biological imperatives
at work that determine what women and men get in their pay packet.
Another fact is the influence of hypergamy, which means that women typically
choose a mate (husband or boyfriend) who earns more than she does. Men
don't have the same preference for a higher-earning mate.
While women prefer to HAVE a higher-earning partner, men generally prefer
to BE the higher-earning partner in a relationship. This simple but profound
difference between the sexes has powerful consequences for the so-called pay
38gap.
These conservative authors are articulating traditionalist views of women
and what they believe women really want. Of course, feminists have always
supported women's right to choose lower paying jobs in exchange for greater
flexibility and the opportunity to stay home with children. Yet, the purveyors of
cultural arguments would suggest that legal protections that protect these choices
and ensure fairness by requiring equal pay for equal work (in time, skills, and
seniority) are not necessary. Rather, these, like other traditionalist positions, rely
36. See Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC (June 2014), available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2014/05/the-case-for-reparations/361631/.
37. Kay Hymowitz, Do Women Really Want Equality?, TIME (Sept. 4, 2013),
http://ideas.time.com/ 2013/09/ 04/do-women-really-want-equality/.
38. Phyllis Schlafly, Facts and Fallacies About Paycheck Fairness, CHRISTIANPOST (Apr. 15,
2014), http://www.christianpost.com/news/facts-and-fallacies-about-paycheck-faimess-
117959/.
BERKELEY JOURNAL OF GENDER, LAW & JUSTICE
on constructions of biological inferiority and then argue tautologically that those
who are biologically inferior can never actually do equal work by dint of their
biology. This is subsequently translated into a political agenda of not reforming
the laws or enacting legislation that substantively ensures an equal playing field
for women and minorities. 39 In reality, in spite of legislation creating causes of
action for discrimination based on sex and race, the culture of white male,
heterosexist, capitalist supremacy rests on the view that women and minorities
are both inherently inferior and unable to perform at the same levels as white
males. This culture further promotes the idea that women and minorities are in
situations of their own making and therefore unequal by choice. These
assumptions make bringing lawsuits-let alone winning them-extraordinarily
difficult.4 °
A similar kind of traditionalism is at work in a number of countries that
retain religious family laws. For instance, attempts at changing the Muslim
personal law in a number of countries have been met with stiff resistance from
religious and cultural conservatives based on arguments about religious
adherence and orthodoxy. 4' The rationale given is that humans cannot change
the divinely mandated roles of men and women. Reforming laws governing
inheritance, polygamy, or women's right to divorce, traditionalists argue, is
illegitimate because these rights and obligations have been set in stone by God
and humans have no authority to change these relationships. These arguments
are advanced against feminists who have demanded greater equality both from
within and from outside of Muslim communities.
In India, for example, the debate has taken on a particularly complex cast
due to the large Muslim minority population ensconced in a non-Muslim
majority. Muslim women activists in India have had to deal with the twin
pressures of intracommunity struggles regarding gender justice and the
experience of being a minority in a sometimes-hostile country in which there is a
majoritarian Hindu nationalist power.42 Hindu nationalists have demanded the
legislation of a uniform civil code (UCC) that eliminates religious-based family
law and forces assimilation into a "neutral" (but not necessarily secular) family
code.43 The UCC had at times been a cherished endeavor of secular, liberal
39. See Anne L. Alston, Neoliberalism in U.S. Family Law: Negative Liberty and Laissez-Faire
Markets in the Minimal State, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25, 29-32 (2014).
40. See, e.g., DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors, 413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (holding
that the plaintiffs bringing a suit on behalf of black women must choose between a claim for
"race discrimination, sex discrimination, or alternatively either, but not a combination of
both").
41. See VRINDA NARAIN, RECLAIMING THE NATION: MUSLIM WOMEN AND THE LAW IN INDIA
7 (2008).
42. See Shalina A. Chibber, Charting A New Path Toward Gender Equality in India: From
Religious Personal Laws to A Uniform Civil Code, 83 IND. L.J. 695, 696 (2008).
43. INDIA CONST. art. 44 ("The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil
code throughout the territory of India."). This is a directive principle enshrined in the
Constitution by the predominantly secularist framers. At the time India's governing charter
was drafted in the 1950s, the UCC was to be drafted and legislated in the future.
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feminists in India because it was one way to deal with the codified gender
inequality in religious law. 4 4 But with the capture of this reform project by the
Hindu right, and its subsequent use to browbeat Muslims and criticize them for
the mistreatment of Muslim women, secular feminists could no longer profess
support for a uniform civil code without also becoming aligned with a divisive
communal or religious politics. At the same time, traditionalists fiom within
Muslim communities were demanding that the religious-based family code be
protected as a critical accommodation for minority rights. They asserted that the
law could not be changed because of its divine provenance. Meanwhile, Muslim
women, working from within their communities and in solidarity with other
Indian women, pushed for both the UCC (until it became politically difficult)
and for internal reforms. 45 Of course, there were also traditionalist women who
resisted change in alliance with male traditionalist authority.
In the Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), one can find similar examples of
cultural/religious reasoning inhibiting law reform in Muslim-majority countries.
The following comes from Egypt:
Reservation to the text of article 16 concerning the equality of men and women
in all matters relating to marriage and family relations during the marriage and
upon its dissolution, without prejudice to the Islamic Sharia's provisions
whereby women are accorded rights equivalent to those of their spouses so as
to ensure a just balance between them. This is out of respect for the sacrosanct
nature of the firm religious beliefs which govern marital relations in Egypt and
which may not be called in question and in view of the fact that one of the most
important bases of these relations is an equivalency of rights and duties so as to
ensure complementary which guarantees true equality between the spouses.
The provisions of the Sharia lay down that the husband shall pay bridal money
to the wife and maintain her fully and shall also make a payment to her upon
divorce, whereas the wife retains full rights over her property and is not
obliged to spend anything on her keep. The Sharia therefore restricts the wife's
rights to divorce by making it contingent on a judge's ruling, whereas no such
restriction is laid down in the case of the husband.
46
These are political choices given an alibi by culture and religion. Muslim
countries vary in practice, and different rules governing marriage and divorce
exist. Some states, like Turkey and Tunisia, have gone so far as to equalize
44. See Chibber, supra note 42, at 701.
45. See Srikanth Reddy, What Would Your Founding Fathers Think? What India's Constitution
Says-and What Its Framers Would Say-About the Current Debate over a Uniform Civil
Code, 41 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 405,418 (2009).
46. Declarations, Reservations and Objections to CEDA W, UN WOMEN (emphasis added),
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm (last visited, Mar. 15,
2015). All countries' reservations to CEDAW, including Egypt, can be found at the United
Nations website.
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divorce, while others like Saudi Arabia and Iran adhere to a strict interpretation
of tradition. 47 Afghanistan is now infamous for Islamicizing Pashtun cultural and
customary legal practice to the exclusion of minorities like the Hazaras and
Uzbeks. 48 There is no single approach to family law even though each iteration
of the law is oftentimes justified by reference to religion. When one digs below
the surface-beyond the formal laws to the normative practice-the
heterogeneity of all that is encompassed as legal can become bewildering.
Culture cannot explain the pluralism in religious laws or the choice of which
interpretation or range of interpretations the state chooses to elevate to the formal
and to enforce.
As Lama Abu-Odeh demonstrates in her work on Egyptian family law,
Egyptian male elites made calculated political choices with regard to
modernizing family law.4 9 In both enacting new laws and adjudicating them,
which rules "ought" to be passed or applied were not self-evident without a
political or ideological agenda of appeasing the different political groups in
Egypt. That agenda drove the elites to split the difference with religious factions,
liberal elites, and feminists, and to modernize some parts of the Egyptian code.
The choice to modernize some aspects of the law, to qualify traditional rules
with modem requirements, was not a cultural choice but a political one that
reveals the exigencies of a new state and the relative bargaining power of the
political players in it (secular male elites, feminists, religious groups).50
Naturally, although broader social and cultural norms have effects on the
ideological commitments of the players, simply declaring culture as their
primary motivation underestimates the political context.
B. Feminist Calls for Context
Given the heterogeneity within cultures, many critical feminists have called
for greater contextual analysis. 5 1 On occasion, this call for nuance and
appreciation of difference has been misread, either conflated with traditionalist
moves to protect culture over women or reduced to a sort of cultural essentialism
47. See Amira Mashhour, Islamic Law and Gender Equality--Could There Be a Common
Ground?: A Study of Divorce and Polygamy in Sharia Law and Contemporary Legislation in
Tunisia and Egypt, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 562, 571-72 (2005) (positing that while the Prophet
Muhammad denounced divorce and advocated reconciliation, divorce under Shar'ia law was
permissible).
48. See Michael N. Schmitt, Xi Targeting and International Humanitarian Law in Afghanistan,
85 INT'L L. STUD. 307, 308 (2009).
49. See Lama Abu-Odeh, Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The Case of Egypt, 37 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1043, 1050 (2004).
50. Id at 1043-1146.
51. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617 (1990)
("If, as critical feminists generally maintain, women's experience has been shaped through
culturally contingent patterns of subordination, no particular experience can claim universal
authentic status.").
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in opposition to gender essentialism. 52 Certainly, there are women who are
firmly within the traditionalist camps. 53 Conservative women have also claimed
the feminist mantle and come out in support of political candidates who stand for
a politics at odds with the historical concerns of liberal, critical race, and
postcolonial feminisms, not to mention queer advocacy. 54 But to conflate
minority feminists and feminists from the Global South with these traditionalists
is to do a grave disservice to the commitments of minority feminists and also to
foreclose solidarity in a number of shared projects, such as legal reform toward
greater gender equality. Moreover, such conflation elevates the cultural
commitments of minority feminists (to the extent that they exist) above their
gender justice commitment by fiat, and does so in contravention of their own
priorities. It obscures the fact that everyone in a heterogeneous society is
negotiating multiple identities and hybridity-not just minorities. While many
feminists have moved beyond equating minority and Global South feminists with
cultural relativists, there remains an ardent faction of universalists who continue
to point out the problems of accommodating minority cultures or "eroding"
human rights by admitting heterodox interpretations.
55
This brings me to the next Section and an observation about the very nature
of religion and culture as they are understood by both universalists and cultural
relativists/apologists: both consider culture to be immutable. That is to say that
one can positively claim a particular practice or belief as "cultural," and also
claim that it has remained unchanged over time. This view prevents arguments
that get at the political decision-making behind either abandoning or preserving
"cultural" practices and moves the argument onto much less contestable terrain.
II. RELATIVISTS AND UNIVERSALISTS: A VIEW OF RELIGION/CULTURE AS
MIRROR IMAGE
While the assertion that culture is an unchanging set of social arrangements
usually comes from relativists, a mirror image assumption is made by rights
universalists. 56 For instance, claims that culture or religion prohibit the reform of
gender-iniquitous laws are contested precisely as though those assertions were
true. An argument that religion prevents equal access to divorce is met with calls
52. Bhabani Shankar Nayak, Challenges of Cultural Relativism and the Future of Feminist
Universalism, 6 J. POL. & L. 83, 83-85 (2013).
53. See Nancy Leong, Dissenting In and Dissenting Out, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 723, 731 (2014).
54. Kathleen Parker, Op-Ed., Can Conservative Women be Feminists?, WASH. POST (Dec. 9,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kathleen-parker-can-feminism-see-the-
right/2014/12/09/7f572a1 c-7fd7-1 1e4-9f38-95al 87e4c 1 f7_story.html.
55. For instance, the late Susan Moller Okin is an example of a rights universalist in that she
failed to situate her particular commitments to a liberally configured set of rights within any
kind of culture. See, e.g., Susan Moller Okin, Feminism, Women's Human Rights, and
Cultural Differences, in DECENTERING THE CENTER: PHILOSOPHY FOR A MULTICULTURAL,
POSTCOLONIAL, AND FEMINIST WORLD 26 (Uma Narayan & Sandra Harding eds., 2000).
56. Id. Martha Nussbaum takes a more nuanced universalist approach. See MARTHA NUSSBAUM,
WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH (2001).
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for the abandonment of any engagement with religion and a demand for a move
into the culturally neutral space of universal human rights. 57 A cultural defense
that asks for judicial leniency for forced marriage is met with a feminist demand
that such a cultural defense be viewed as entirely irrelevant to the judicial
disposition of such a case. 58 Once culture is fixed, bounded, and reified in this
manner, the conflicts arising between traditionalists and universalists become
more intractable, and the strategies to deal with culture become much more akin
to the kind of civilizing mission familiar to ex-colonies and subject peoples. On
the other hand, attempts at defending culture from the civilizing mission solidify
it into precisely the unchanging "thing" that it is claimed by both sides to be.
To unpack the above arguments, it is important to think through the
relationship between "backward cultures" and colonialism. The concentration of
efforts by universal rights activists to privatize or progress out of culture or
religion is a well-established strategy with antecedents in the colonial civilizing
mission.59 Universalists espouse the view that but for the cultural baggage they
are burdened with, people in these traditional societies would realize the benefits
of universal human rights and women's rights. Progress is made in spite of the
burdens imposed by religion and culture, particularly when culture is pushed
back in favor of universal rights. Moreover, culture is something women
preserve, but do not create. So women may become passive victims of their
culture but they are rarely the agents of and within their culture. Thus, culture
is seen as a totality from which women must exit in order to be truly free.
The colonial notion of a discernible and fixed culture was in some measure
a disciplinary exercise in administrating subject peoples. The need to administer
colonies efficiently drove the creation of taxonomies, classifications, and
codification of information gathered by Oriental scholars sent to the field to learn
about the natives. Immutable cultural and civilizational difference was not a
product of the self-awareness and self-description of native subjects. But they
became much more so once the colonial authorities differentiated between
groups and attached rights and privileges to them based on that difference. For
example, as Ayesha Jalal notes, the creation of a Muslim electorate and a
politically significant separation between Hindus and Muslims in India gave rise
to an identity politics that resulted to some extent in the partition of the
subcontinent. 6 1 Indeed, the very notion of "subcontinent" and "India" with its
cultural particularity and geographical boundedness itself is a colonial artifact. In
the post-independence state, Muslims have had that identity both reified for them
by a majoritarian communal politics that continues to castigate them as fifth
columnists, and have reified it themselves in order to protect their "religious"
57. See, e.g., IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?, supra note 14.
58. ANNE PHILLIPS, MULTICULTURALISM WITHOUT CULTURE 73-99 (2009).
59. Choudhury, supra note 22, at 170.
60. Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1469 (2003).
61. See Ayesha Jalal & Anil Seal, Alternative to Partition: Muslim Politics Between the Wars,
15 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 415, 415-17 (1981).
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rights, legal rights, and their political identity-sometimes their physical safety
as well.
The tragedy of this history is that culture has been used as a shield to
protect minorities and subject peoples from interference by colonial authorities,
majorities, the postcolonial state and, increasingly, the international universalists.
The more culture is used in this manner, treated as transcending challenge and
trumping universals, the more it appears that universalists assume authority and
demand that culture be made mundane and open to contestation by "them."
Nothing is sacred, not even the sacred. The power dynamic that resides in this
conflict will be discussed in greater detail below, but it is important to point it
out here. The colonial distributions of power in this conflict make it very
difficult to resolve to everyone's satisfaction. And women are often left to make
shift for themselves between the universalists who denigrate their religion or
culture and the male traditionalists who denigrate their gender. Both universalists
and traditionalists may discount the work of feminists engaged in reinterpreting
religion as either unauthorized by tradition or ineffective as a form of apology.
And, of course, there are women who choose one side over the other rather than
inhabiting an increasingly uncomfortable middle ground. But this is not to say
that those who refuse to simply choose a side are passive bystanders while the
conflict rages. As the Article shall posit below, those in the middle positions,
negotiating multiple identities and political commitments, are integral
contributors to the debate.
The second point that must be made here is that by shifting the idea of
culture onto the terrain of the Global South, universalists mask the cultural
content in their own articulation of women's rights and present their own
62struggles as culturally neutral. The liberal notions of human rights and
women's rights did not emerge fully formed in a vacuum. Rather, they
developed within the cultural and historical context of a Europe wracked by
religious intolerance and warfare and saw their legal culmination in declarations
and conventions that were enacted after the genocidal violence of the Second
World War. Curiously, the genocidal violence of colonialism was insufficient to
create a global consensus around combatting violence against religious and
cultural "Others," in spite of the numerous claims by subject peoples to universal
humanity and its attendant rights. The independence leaders of colonies from
India to Africa and the Middle East used liberal and universal notions of
citizenship, justice, and the rule of law to demand freedom and recognition of
human rights. And yet the universality of these concepts never seemed to stretch
quite far enough to cover subject peoples of color. Amongst thinkers articulating
theories of liberty and equality, Mahatma Gandhi stands out as articulating an
indigenous basis for rights based not on Liberalism but Hinduism and Indian
philosophy. Certainly that philosophy articulated an alternative that
62. See Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42
HARV. INT'L L.J. 201, 204-06 (2001).
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encompassed the entire world's colonized population. 63
The rather obvious observation here is that universal rights may be
theoretically "universal," but the way they are put into practice does involve
cultural and perhaps even religious substructures. 64 For instance, women's rights
most often attach to individual women and seek to enhance their autonomy from
other humans. What is considered important is the ability to make individual
decisions and to control one's own physical being and social and work prospects
without the undue influence of others. This is a very particular notion of
autonomy with a historical and geographical provenance. It is a conception of
human thriving that may make little sense to more communitarian people who
operate both individually but also in far more interdependent and integrated
ways than Western liberal societies.
To be clear, the argument is not that autonomy and equality are of lesser
value than community and complementarity. Indeed, this Article advances no
such normative position. Women's lack of agency and the argument that uses
their deep embeddedness in family structures as justification to prevent reform
are very problematic even in liberal societies. But ignoring the reality of
embeddedness, community, and substantive equality that takes seriously the
differing roles and desires of women is equally troubling. 65 Moreover, rights
agendas that require women to behave as though these realities are unimportant
or that require the realities to change radically before women reap any benefits
66afforded by rights are unlikely to succeed. A discussion of this point appears in
greater detail in the next Section, but the point here is that universal rights
already have a cultural and political valence that is often obscured by
universalists who only talk about culture in oppositional terms and with an
67assumption that rights will only work in a secular framework. Moreover,
universalists do not account for the critique that "rights" alone will not yield the
kind of full emancipation that women desire. Rather, their acquisition may mask
certain distributions of power and resources that elevate some women over
others. That cultural valence, the underlying assumptions, and the distributional
63. John Leubsdorf, Gandhi's Legal Ethics, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 923, 933 (1999).
64. See generally THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL
AND LOCAL (Mark Goodale & Saly Engle Merry eds., 2007) (exploring the local mediations
of international human rights).
65. See Eva Feder Kittay, Searching for an Overlapping Consensus: A Secular Care Ethics
Feminist Responds to Religious Feminists, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 468, 477 (2007); Robin L.
West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist
Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 149, 189 (2000).
66. Furthermore, there are other vernaculars that might be used to express a desire for greater
gender justice other than human rights. We have lost a great deal of that capacity through the
hegemony of human rights talk. For instance, we might couch our desire for justice and
equality through the language of redistribution and material feminism. See, e.g., MATERIAL
FEMINISM: A READER IN CLASS, DIFFERENCE AND WOMEN'S LIVES (Rosemary Hennessy &
Chrys Ingraham eds., 1997).
67. The religious valence of secularism is similarly obscured by most secularists. See, e.g.,
TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR (2003).
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impact of rights matter when it comes down to the practical implementation of
reforms in a particular context.
Furthermore, universalists do not pay adequate attention to the contests
over cultural meaning and practice that continue to take place within various
societies that allowed for legal reform. For example, reproductive rights battles
that have been an ongoing source of struggle for feminists in the United States
have been construed as part of a culture war. 68 However, US feminists tend to
see the fight as more of a political rather than a cultural one, whereas a similar
fight in Afghanistan is construed as the reverse. 69 Uma Narayan points to this
distinction in her observation about the rhetoric of dowry deaths. 70 She imagines
a reversal of the gaze in which an Indian journalist reports on the manifold cases
of domestic violence against women in the United States as a consequence of
culture. 71 As "Hindu culture" is deployed as an explanation, 72 so might
"Christian" or "American" culture be used as an explanation in the American
context. Certainly, we have begun speaking more about "gun culture" and "rape
culture" in the United States, but these are cast as part of an aberrant subculture
that cuts against the norm-not as part of the culture in its totalized and singular
form.
The point is that arguments from universalists regarding culture very often
mimic those of traditionalists: both assume that culture as a social construct is
essential and immutable. By assuming the homogeneity of the "religious"
position, they both obscure dissenting views that might be more fruitfully
engaged and foregrounded as counternarratives and interpretations that the state
could choose to adopt as a basis for reform. Moreover, universalists often focus
on the culture of "Others" while obscuring their own cultural commitments. 73 A
pro-universal human rights position is normalized as the neutral secular position
devoid of any cultural or religious baggage. In other words, it is a totalized
representation sans culture that externalizes culture as all theirs. From this space,
critiques of culture and religion that seem eerily familiar to post-colonial
scholars are launched against people in the Global South burdened with both. On
the other hand, traditionalist defenses assert the same kind of cultural purity and
totality that demands protection and preservation. Both sides' constructions of
68. See Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101
COLUM. L. REv. 181, 196 (2001).
69. See Melanie M. Brookes, Reproductive Rights in Afghanistan: Considerations of Abortion
Regulation in Light of the Afghan Reconstruction Process, 18 CONN. J. INT'L L. 595, 596
(2003).
70. Uma Narayan, Cross-Cultural Connections, Border-Crossings, and "Death by Culture":
Thinking About Dowry-Murders in India and Domestic- Violence Murders in the United




73. See, e.g., Patricia A. Broussard, Female Genital Mutilation: Exploring Strategies for Ending
Ritualized Torture; Shaming, Blaming, and Utilizing the Convention Against Torture, 15
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 19, 40 (2008).
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culture are deeply troubling, particularly when they are used to understand
particular subjects such as "Muslim women" or "Muslim men."
III. A COMMON THREAT: THE LIBERAL FEMINIST-IMPERIALIST ALLIANCE
IN THE WAR ON TERROR
Though colonial powers engaged in civilizing subject populations in the
Global South did not shy away from claiming cultural superiority, that claim has
become far less acceptable in the postcolonial world. Explanations of the
distribution of wealth and power that are grounded in culture, race, or other
identity claims, while still made, are often called out as forms of discriminatory
thinking.74 Nevertheless, these explanations have made an alarming comeback to
rationalize a number of structural and distributional inequalities. 75 One of the
most acceptable uses of cultural claims is as an explanation for violence and
gender oppression in Muslim communities. 76 The War on Terror has resuscitated
and normalized the use of religion and culture as an explanation for violence by
Muslims worldwide through the "clash of civilizations" theory. 77 Furthermore,
the mirroring referred to above has been a consistent feature of the War on
Terror, with groups of Muslims themselves asserting an essentialized cultural
and religious difference from the "West." Indeed, while cultural or religious
defenses might be met with skepticism and even derision when deployed against
some communities or used by those communities to demand accommodation,
they are entirely acceptable, if not expected, from Muslims. 78 In fact, Muslims
are readily believed when they claim a religious/cultural defense because that
cultural essentialism is integral to the growing phenomenon of Islamophobia
79
74. DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE: POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AND
HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE 3-6 (Sherry B. Ortner et al. eds., 2000); Palma Joy Strand,
Inheriting Inequality: Wealth, Race, and the Laws of Succession, 89 OR. L. REV. 453, 478
(2010).
75. See generally NIALL FERGUSON, CIVILIZATION: THE WEST AND THE REST (2011) (arguing
that the West has progressed because of the development of six "killer applications" that
failed to develop in other parts of the globe).
76. See Sahar F. Aziz, From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: Muslim-American Women in the
Crosshairs oflntersectionality, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 191, 238 (2012).
77. Dennis J.D. Sandole, The "Fog of War" on Terrorism: U.S. Policy, Deception, and the
Continuing Slide into the "Clash of Civilizations," 13 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 149, 161-
62 (2006).
78. See Volpp, supra note 25.
79. While there has been some resistance to the term "Islamophobia," I use it to denote the
prejudices and discriminations faced by people because they are Muslim and also the fear of
the spread of Islam and Muslims into the West. It differs from racism, which often overlaps
or intersects with Islamophobia when a Muslim subject is also a racial minority. However,
white Muslims who are not observably Muslim are also affected by the dominant negative
stereotypes and discourse about Islam even if they are not faced with racism per se. To deny
the existence of this form of prejudice is to yet again exceptionalize Islam and Muslims
given that other religious communities such as Christians, Buddhists, Jews, and atheists can
readily claim discrimination on the basis of belief or nonbelief. Having said that, not every
criticism-internal or external-of Islam or adherents of Islam amounts to Islamophobia and
its use to silence such critique, particularly of right-wing Islamists, is highly problematic. See
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that has marked the War on Terror.80 The effect is to reinforce the mistaken view
of a monolithic religion across cultural differences (conflating religion and
culture as it so often happens) in order to use both religion and culture to create a
thoroughly cultured Muslim who is entirely incapable of independent decision-
making, fungible with all other believing Muslims, and entirely and
deterministically motivated by the same set of beliefs in Islam.
Because many universalists consider Islam to be the archetypical
patriarchal religion mired in the gender inequalities and prejudices of the Dark
Ages, they view Muslim men as agents while Muslim women remain the passive
objects of male action and power.8 1 Similarly, traditionalists wish to maintain or
reintroduce just such a distribution of power regardless of the progress that has
been made. It is necessary to complicate the uses of culture by both sides-
universalists as well as traditionalists-by exploring the ways in which they both
fail to explain what is actually happening in many Muslim contexts. This failure
becomes evident, first, by looking at the caricatured subjectivity of Muslim
males who have become the feminist nightmare and juxtaposing this caricature
to the vulnerable Muslim man; and, second, by unsettling the assumptions about
the power inequalities between men and women in the War on Terror and
underscoring the interdependence of Muslim women and men. As a corollary to
the exploration of gender roles among Muslims, it is also useful to highlight the
role of Western women in the prosecution of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and the gender reversals that are often present in these contexts of invasion and
occupation. Ultimately, the very category of "ally" in gendered terms needs to be
questioned carefully when alliances are complicated by the War on Terror. In
other words, Muslim women have been pitted against Muslim men in the War on
Terror; oppression of these women is daily reported in the news and has
garnered sympathy from women in the West. 82 However, Muslim women are
also imperiled by imperialist violence in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen,
Pakistan, and other places subject to drone strikes. 83 The violence experienced at
the hands of Muslim men as well as foreign armed forces makes for uneasy and
uncertain alliances across gender and geographic lines.
The emphasis on Muslim male violence against women and the specific
reliance on religion and culture as the determinants of that violence allow some
Defining "Islamophobia ", CENTER FOR RACE & GENDER,
http://crg.berkeley.edu/content/islamophobia/defining-islamophobia (last visited Mar. 19,
2015).
80. Karen Engle, Constructing Good Aliens and Good Citizens: Legitimizing the War on
Terror(ism), 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 59, 75 (2004).
81. See Roxane Davis, Women on the Front Line of Reform in Post-Revolutionary Iran: The
Role of Female Political Activism in Lifting the Veil of Cultural Relativism & Exposing the
Democratic Will Beyond Patriarchal Interpretations of Islam, 15 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 52, 59-
60(2011).
82. See Aziz, supra note 76, at 228.
83. See Holly Taylor, The Constitutions of Afghanistan and Iraq: The Advancement of Women s
Rights, 13 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 137, 143 (2006).
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feminist activists to evade their own complicity in imperialism.84 The acceptance
of the "bad guy" subject is not without serious consequence for Muslim women.
What is defined as Islamic terrorism, attributed to religion and culture, invites
much harsher punishment and regulation of Muslims in general, feeds into an
ongoing justification for collective punishment, and creates an increasingly
fearful and marginalized group made up of both men and women who often do
not support Islamist groups or their political agendas.8 5 This, in turn, complicates
the response to the very real violence that is done to women within their
communities.
A. The Problem of Violent/Vulnerable Muslim Men
From Nigeria to Afghanistan, Somalia, and the United States, male
violence is often attributed to Islam even when not self-avowedly Islamist or
ideological.86 As such, preoccupations with women's oppression under Islamic
patriarchy put some feminists on the same side as imperialists who cynically
justify therapeutic violence on the basis of universal values and rights. The
feminist-imperialist alliance based on this common threat divides men and
women in a perpetrator/victim paradigm and fails to account for the much more
complex reality of vulnerability and power that exists among Muslims. 87
The construct of the violent Muslim male hardly needs elaboration. The
media is replete with examples from wife-beating husbands, to honor-killing
fathers, jihadist terrorists, and Islamist politicians who seek to control women's
bodies and lives. 88 Even secular dictators like Saddam Hussein are made to fit
the barbaric Muslim mold as reflections of the inability of Arabs and Muslims to
rule themselves without violence and oppression. 89 Instructed by his religion, the
Muslim male is always on the verge of violence. Recent concerns about the
potential dangers posed by Muslim men are reflected in state attempts to counter
84. See Kathleen Kennedy, Manhood and Subversion During World War I: The Cases of Eugene
Debs and Alexander Berkman, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1661, 1662 (2004) ("[S]ince the early 1980s
American citizenship has undergone a remasculinization that rehabilitates the citizen-soldier
as the quintessential symbol of American values and protector of American freedoms....
[B]oth policy and cultural images increasingly regenerate militarized manhood, linking it to a
violent, aggressive, and often misogynist defense of the nation and the heterosexual
family.... against an irrational, repressive, wantonly violent, and uniquely pernicious
enemy-the Muslim male terrorist.").
85. See Kenneth Lasson, Bloodstains on a "Code of Honor": The Murderous Marginalization of
Women in the Islamic World, 30 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 407, 434 (2009).
86. Id. at431-33.
87. DEEPA KUMAR, ISLAMOPHOBIA AND THE POLITICS OF EMPIRE 41-60 (2012).
88. See generally Brendon Tagg, Jihad, Race and Western Media, Post-September 11, 4
SOCIETIES WITHOUT BORDERS 317 (2009), available at
http://societieswithoutborders.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/tagg.pdf (discussing Western
media representations of Muslims).
89. See Aaron M. Herzig, In Defense of Terrorist States: Acree v. Republic of Iraq and the Bush
Administration 's Attempts to Shield Iraq and Saddam Hussein from Suits by American
Citizens and Soldiers, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 771, 772 (2004).
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"radicalization." 90 As Arun Kundnani points out, the theory of radicalization that
has gained currency in both the United States and the United Kingdom posits a
slippery slope from the practice of Islam to outright jihad. 9 1 According to law
enforcement, the first signs of radicalization are a change in clothing and a
greater adherence to Islamic practice. 92 From there, once Muslims are on the
"conveyer belt" of practice, it is a short ride to committing acts of violence in
their own communities or leaving to fight in the Middle East.93 Thus, any
outward signs of Islamic practice prompt greater scrutiny and regulation.
From the first days of the War on Terror, when Muslim men were
interrogated for just being Muslim, to the latest revelations that the National
Security Agency has been monitoring Muslims without probable cause and
based only on identity, the justification for this treatment of Muslims has been a
generalized belief that Muslims are a threat. 94 Theatrical hearings on Capitol Hill
and pronouncements from political leaders keep the fear palpable. 95 For
example, London mayor Boris Johnson asserted that children should be removed
from "radical" Muslim families. 96 To be clear, since practicing conservative
forms of Islam is often conflated with radicalism, it seems likely that Johnson is
suggesting an Orwellian intervention into the families of many Muslims. In the
United States, this possibility became a reality when the daughter of a Muslim
couple ran away from home and claimed to fear honor killing if she told her
parents that she wanted to convert to Christianity. 97 Both parents declared
publicly that she could choose any religion she desired, and even though no
evidence of violence or threat of violence was presented to the courts
determining her removal from the home, the child was not returned to the
parents. 98 The connection between Islam and violence is so strong that even
90. ARUN KUNDNANI, THE MUSLIMS ARE COMING!: ISLAMOPHOBIA, EXTREMISM, AND THE
DOMESTIC WAR ON TERROR 115-150 (2014) (describing the assumption made by numerous





94. Scott Michelman, Who Can Sue over Government Surveillance?, 57 UCLA L. REV. 71, 99
(2009).
95. See William Saletan, Muslim McCarthyism, SLATE (Mar. 9, 2011, 8:47 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and politics/framegame/2011/03/muslim-mccarthyism
.html (describing the King hearings on Muslim radicalization); see also Linda E. Fisher,
Guilt by Expressive Association: Political Profiling, Surveillance and the Privacy of Groups,
46 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 631 (2004).
96. Boris Johnson: Children at Risk of Radicalisation Should Be in Care, BBC NEWS (Mar. 3,
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-26413024.
97. See Tim Padgett, A Florida Culture-War Circus over Rifqa Bary, TIME (Aug.
24, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1918228-1,00.html
98. See id; John Couwels, Police: No Evidence Teen Was Threatened over Christianity, CNN
(Sept. 14, 2009),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/09/14/florida.muslim.convert/index.html#cnnSTCText ("The
girl had told investigators her father never saw her in her school cheerleading outfit because
she feared his disapproval. But investigators stated in the report they saw pictures of the girl
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vehement disavowals are insufficient to quiet the fear and anxieties that are
invoked through the signifier of "honor killing."
99
The construction of Muslim masculinity as essentially violent not only
provokes state regulation and surveillance but also conceals the vulnerability of
Muslim men and boys. From 9/11 onwards, Muslims and those looking like
Muslims have been subject to racialized, physical violence. 100 The violence has
ranged from the shocking torture of Muslim men in Iraqi and Afghan detention
centers, such as Abu Ghraib or Camp Delta,10 1 to the more mundane domestic
murder or brutal beating at the hands of citizens in the United States. Perversely,
Muslim men are depicted as barbarians, and, as a result, they can be subjected to
brutal forms of violence to reform that barbarity. 102 Violence done to them is
justified by their own supposedly innate violence and through the Orientalist
trope of "they only understand violence." As Judith Butler notes in her work on
Palestinians, Muslim men and boys then become disposable and utterly
ungreivable-always a threat. 103 A stark example of the callousness with which
Muslim lives are treated is the categorization of all Muslim men and boys
between the ages of fifteen and thirty-five as "military age males" and, therefore,
legitimate targets of drone strikes.104 This definition works to criminalize all
males in that age range without due process or any evidence of their actual
activities or affiliations and to dramatically reduce the number of "civilians" in
drone strikes through an act of simple redefinition. If the United States
government uses guilt by association, then it hardly comes as a surprise that
certain people in the United States would read this as an authorization for
vigilante justice and violence against Muslims.
B. Complicating the Narratives: Men/Women/Allies/Enemies
The depiction of Muslim men as violent terrorists serves to justify their
brutal treatment in the War on Terror. So do the stories of Muslim male violence
against women. However, these accounts conveniently mask the ongoing
victimization of women by the violence of foreign troops engaged in a military
mission to eradicate terrorists. Undoubtedly, Muslim women suffer at the hands
in her cheerleading uniform prominently displayed in the living room of the Bary's Ohio
home." (emphasis added)).
99. See Cyra Akila Choudhury, Globalizing the Margins: Legal Exiles in the War on Terror and
Liberal Feminism's War for Muslim Women, 9 INT'L REV. OF CONSTITUTIONALISM, no. 2,
2010, at 1, 5-6.
100. See Ming H. Chen, Alienated: A Reworking of the Racialization Thesis After September 11,
18 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 411, 416-17 (2010).
101. See Atif Rehman, The Court of Last Resort: Seeking Redress for Victims of Abu-Ghraib
Torture Through the Alien Tort Claims Act, 16 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 493, 495-97
(2006).
102. See KUMAR, supra note 87.
103. See JUDITH BUTLER, FRAMES OF WAR: WHEN IS LIFE GRIEVABLE? 31 (2009).
104. Glenn Greenwald, "Militants": Media Propaganda, SALON (May 28, 2012, 9:32 PM),
http://www.salon.com/2012/05/29/militants media propaganda/.
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of abusive men and patriarchal structures just as women do in any other male-
dominated state. But, their vulnerability is exacerbated by foreign intervention
and the violence of war. 105 For instance, in states like Afghanistan, where
women in some areas are already subject to strict regulation because of the
gender policing of the Taliban and the conservatism of society, foreign military
intervention that places male family members at risk clearly jeopardizes the
security of the family. 106 As a result, feminists who have championed the use of
intervention to bring change for Afghan women have also been in the
uncomfortable position of allying with the US political establishment in its
imperialism and violence against Afghans. Moreover, it is unclear that any
lasting change or security can be guaranteed for Afghan women once the United
States and allied troops leave the country. 1
07
If feminist alliances with imperialism were problematic in Afghanistan, the
revelation of women human rights abusers and torturers in Iraq made the
"sisterhood is global" slogan even more difficult to accept. 108 The juxtaposition
of the stereotypical violent Muslim male with the violent American female
soldier disarranged the gendering of victimhood. Women as oppressors-
reminiscent of the women of Empire in the Orient and Africa and the plantation
mistresses of antebellum America-made the concept of a "shared" subjugation
impossible to sustain. The gendered nature of the torture and the feminization of
Iraqi prisoners as subjects of rape and sexual humiliation also made the neat
divisions of women and men into victim/perpetrator roles unsustainable.
10 9
These expressions of imperial violence and the reality that Iraqi women fared
quite well in terms of gender equality and opportunity under Saddam Hussein cut
against the simplistic feminist rhetoric that rests on universal ideals of women's
shared oppression and against the bases of the demand for intervention to secure
women's human rights.110 Furthermore, these contradictory distributions of
gender power raise the question of how and with whom alliances within this
complex matrix of power relations form. Can feminists who support women's
rights and the use of force to secure it be allies of the same women who stand to
105. See Lasson, supra note 85, at 434.
106. Nancy Gallagher, The International Campaign Against Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan, 5
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 367, 372 (2001).
107. See generally Nusrat Choudhury, Constrained Spaces for Islamic Feminism: Women's
Rights and the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 155 (2007)
(discussing the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan and the difficulty Islamic feminists may
face in promoting women's rights through law).
108. The phrase "Sisterhood is Global" comes from SISTERHOOD IS GLOBAL: THE
INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S MOVEMENT ANTHOLOGY 329 (Robin Morgan ed., 1984).
109. See generally Johanna Bond, A Decade After Abu Ghraib: Lessons in "Softening Up" the
Enemy and Sex-Based Humiliation, 31 LAW & INEQ. 1 (2012) (describing the gendered
nature of the abuses at Abu Ghraib and analyzing how the perpetration of those abuses by
women created an ambiguous public narrative).
110. See Stephen Kinser, End Human Rights Imperialism Now, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 31, 2010),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/201 0/dec/3 1/human-rights-
imperialism-james-hoge.
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lose the male members of their families to such violence? Does imperial violence
make activism on issues of violence against women harder in local contexts?
Can secular, liberal feminists who are committed to gender justice form alliances
with women who have a radically different conception of what it means to be
free from that envisioned by Liberalism? Treating Muslim women as primarily
subordinated by males acting on religious authority requires ignoring or
oversimplifying the complexities which underscore the reality that women are
not always allies, that men are not always enemies, and that culture and religion
(Islam) cannot explain the problems of gender inequality and oppression when
liberal ideology propels imperial intervention.
IV. "CULTURAL" DIFFERENCES, AGENCY, AND AUTHORITY IN LIBERAL
FEMINIST ACTIVISM
Liberal feminism in its universalist mode has yet to come to grips fully
with its own cultural particularity and exclusionary history. And it has yet to
fully appreciate that it cannot and does not represent "women" as an abstract
subject without history, context, or particularity. Second-wave feminism has
relied on an increasingly challenged assumption of shared subordination based
on gender, and sometimes sex, to advance its agenda while continuing to ignore
the implications of difference."' Over the course of its history, critical feminists
(including postcolonial and race feminists in particular) have repeatedly
confronted mainstream, second-wave feminism with its omissions, elisions, and
obfuscations. 12 This Section explores two concepts that underscore the tension
in liberal feminist thought as it relates to Muslim women and difference.
The first locus of tension involves ideas of women's autonomy. Much has
already been written problematizing autonomy as a feminist value." 3 Further,
there has been heated debate about whether Muslim women have the autonomy
to choose their life paths.' 14 While there can be no expectation that the questions
will be settled here, examining the work autonomy does as a basis for legal
reform when directed at Muslims is important in furthering the discussion on
difference and accommodation. Does the elevation of autonomy as a value
obscure the actual complexities of individuation and relational or familial
realities that most women face in society? To highlight the debate about
Ill. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 1-6
(1990).
112. See Aya Gruber, Neofeminism, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1325, 1329-31 (2013).
113. See, e.g., id. at 1354-57 (describing the problematic nature of the agent-object dichotomy
that characterizes women as either autonomous agents or passive objects); Jane E. Larson,
"Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature 'Deceit ' ": A Feminist Rethinking
of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 424-31 (1993) (discussing the complexity of the
concept of autonomy in the context of sexual consent and sexual fraud). But see Lindsay K.
Charles, Feminists and Firearms: Why Are So Many Women Anti-Choice?, 17 CARDOZO J.L.
& GENDER 297 (2011) (advocating for women's gun ownership as a means of advancing
women's autonomy).
114. See Aziz, supra note 76, at 225.
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autonomy, this Article revisits the enduring questions about veiling, which has
become the iconic symbol of arguments about autonomy, choice, and
oppression.
The second locus of tension is authority and the power to represent. Here,
the gap between claims made by members of the social and economic elite on
behalf of all women, on the one hand, and the particular needs of subaltern
women who may not be able to voice their desires to a global audience, on the
other, must be reexamined. In particular, it is important to explore how
narratives produced by some women speaking about Islam and Muslims are
elevated over others, reinforce the feminism/culture divide, and justify liberal
imperialism. The subsection below discusses two examples: the writer and
neoconservative activist, Ayaan Hirsi Ali and the women's group FEMEN.
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who has been championed as a feminist advocate and
elevated well above most other Muslim scholars and activists working toward
gender justice, has assumed the authority to speak, and her words carry weight in
the public discourse about Muslim women. 15 While Ali presents herself as an
insider with special knowledge who has since left the fold, FEMEN offers us a
contrasting view. The advocates of FEMEN, best known for their bare-breasted
tactics, assert that they need no insider knowledge to recognize and challenge
Islamic misogyny. 116 While there are many other liberal feminist groups that
have worked tirelessly for women's rights, FEMEN presents an interesting case
because of its use of social and conventional media," 17 and its ability to reach
across borders through its spectacular tactics. 8 As such, its mode of activism is
particularly reductionist in ways that more sustained efforts inevitably cannot be.
Yet, FEMEN has been hailed as bringing attention to women's rights even if the
content of its work is problematic. 119 Both types of activists represented by Ali
and FEMEN offer opportunities to examine who assumes authority to speak
about the issues facing Muslim women and the result of such representational
politics. In reconciling the artificially created and apparently enduring divide
115. See, e.g., AYAAN HIRSI ALl, THE CAGED VIRGIN: AN EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION FOR
WOMEN AND ISLAM (2008).
116. See Sara C. Nelson, Inna Shevchenko Responds To Muslim Women Against Femen 's Open
Letter In Wake Of Amino Tyler Topless Jihad, HUFFINGTON POST U.K. (Aug. 4, 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/04/08/inna-shevchenko-muslim-women-femens-
open-letter-amina-tyler-topless-jihadn 3035439.html; see also Dialika Neufeld, The Body
Politic: Getting Naked To Change the World, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L (May 11, 2012),
http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/europe/femen-activists-get-naked-to-raise-political-
awareness-a-832028.html. FEMEN, an infamous women's activist group known for its
public nudity displays, realized that such protests create scandal, and such scandal can




119. See Alessandro Bianchi, Women's Rights Group Femen at the Venice Film Festival, CHI.
TRIB., http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/sns-celebrity-pix-506-photo.html
(last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
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between feminism and culture/religion, Ali and FEMEN are an integral part of
the logic and practices of liberal feminism that make the problem seem
intractable.
These two loci of autonomy and authority also point to a central problem
that has increasingly troubled women's rights activism in liberal societies: the
rise of women who assert the seemingly liberal right to choose illiberal and
restrictive practices and represent these as consistent with women's rights.
Examining both prompts further questions of whether we should accommodate
these women within the fold of feminism and, if we do admit them as feminists,
how to accommodate their beliefs and practices. Accommodation of difference,
of course, depends on the context: minorities within liberal, democratic societies
are necessarily different than women belonging to a majority in illiberal states.
Feminists must develop increasingly nuanced approaches to this sort of
heterogeneity and location in women's global aspirations to gender justice.
A. Autonomy: Liberal Societies/Restrictive Choices
The right to decide the course of one's own life is surely one of the most
important capabilities afforded to human beings. The feminist movement, in its
varying strands, has fought a common battle for the right of women to be seen as
individuals, more than merely appendages of males or members of a family,
tribe, or nation. 12 Individuality and a "room of one's own"'121 have been critical
in the advancement of women's rights and protections. Yet, the questions about
how that autonomy is actually lived, operates in women's lives, and reflects their
experiences of relational entanglement remain a complexity that liberal feminists
often gloss over. 122 Furthermore, some feminists assume that they can perceive
autonomy across locations, socioeconomic class, group identities, and time
without explaining how they are able to do so. The veil debate, and its
entanglement with concerns about autonomy, has become an example of the
variety of conflicts and fissures that have only been exacerbated after September
11. As Vasuki Nesiah so aptly points out:
Veiling practices become a fraught site where women's bodies hover in
(dis)location between being flattened as the terrain on which we act, and being
animated as agents actively engaging the terrain of colonial and anti-colonial
struggle. On the one hand, women's bodies are mythologized as the passive
120. See generally ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, THE ESSENTIAL FEMINIST READER (2007) (compiling
the writings of feminists from various countries and generations about women's rights); see
also Elizabeth M. Schneider, Hearing Women Not Being Heard. On Carol Gilligan's
Getting Civilized and the Complexity of Voice, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (1994) (discussing
the difficulty that women have with their voices being "heard").
121. VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN 188 (1934).
122. RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE
SOCIAL SELF 3-5 (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000) [hereinafter
RELATIONAL AUTONOMY].
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terrain of cultural tradition and narratives of progress. Simultaneously,
however, women's bodies are mobilized as agents, with veiling practices read
as expressive of agency, acting for and against these same terrains, be it to
defend colonialism, or contest it. 
123
These are two competing views of how women come to veil. The first
asserts an unthinking adherence to tradition or the coercion of culture, while the
second posits a proactive assertion of agency. Either of these views may be
vigorously proclaimed as the truth. For instance, many conversations with
friends and colleagues in the "West" reveal a deep-seated commitment to
autonomy and personal rights. Most of them, as liberal feminists, believe that
they are able to decide what to wear freely (this is the autonomy extreme).
However, illiberal choices to dress conservatively, when made by Muslim
women, are not considered choice per se. Those women are coerced by culture
(this would the cultural determinism extreme). The conversation, which is likely
familiar to many, typically goes like this:
Liberal Feminist: Women should have the right to wear whatever they want.
Muslim Woman: Yes, and that ought to include the veil.
LF: Well, yes, but the veil is an oppressive article; it connotes patriarchal
oppression, not freedom. Women should be free to not wear anything at all if
they so desire. Covering up one's body is hardly a celebration of freedom.
MW: So, the choice to wear a veil is the internalization of oppression while the
choice to be naked is liberation?
LF: European women can wear whatever they like. But Muslim women
cannot, and that's the problem.
MW: So, European or American Muslim women who veil present no problem.
LF: Except that they are not exercising a free choice but are driven to veil by a
patriarchal religion. If they weren't, they would be wearing bikinis at the
beach.
Over and again, the meaning of the veil is "settled" by some liberal
feminists (and, indeed, by some conservative Muslims). 124 Even in the context of
Europe and the United States, where state laws guarantee the right to certain
personal freedoms, the choice to wear a veil is seen not as a free choice but as a
123. Vasuki Nesiah, The Ground Beneath Her Feet: "Third World" Feminisms, 4 J. INT'L
WOMEN'S STUD. 30, 32 (2003).
124. See Adrien Katherine Wing & Monica Nigh Smith, Critical Race Feminism Lifts the Veil?:
Muslim Women, France, and the HeadscarfBan, 39 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 743, 759-62 (2006)
(discussing the rationales behind wearing the scarf and the religious meaning of the hijab).
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compulsion of religion. I am not denying that for some women the choice is
constrained by internalized patriarchal norms or even external pressure. But it is
far from self-evident that for all women, the choice to veil is driven by
compulsion or even religion. 125 Indeed, even in the face of evidence that some
veiled women have chosen to adopt the covering against the wishes of their
parents, their husbands, or other family members, such choice is dismissed. 126 In
a move all too familiar to students of Islamophobia, the particular is
generalized. 127 Women in Saudi Arabia become the stand-ins for Muslim women
everywhere, much as Arabs become the archetypical Muslim, and, more
recently, as I argue above, the violent Muslim male becomes paradigmatic of
Islam itself.
Again, as Nesiah points out: "The meanings of the veil are hardly
transcendental."'' 28 Rather, differences in state regulation, class, age, ethnicity,
and history all have layers to add in terms of why women may or may not veil. 1
29
One cannot equate Saudi Arabia with Malaysia, or a woman working in a paddy
field in Bangladesh with a hijabi Turkish college student. Yet, for many, the
heterogeneity, equivocality, and complexity of the practices of modesty are
reduced to matters of some abstract and common religion or culture.' 
30
Further, the equation of wearing nothing or next to nothing, of inviting the
male (or female) gaze with "freedom," is equally reductionist. Perhaps it is felt
as freedom for some women, but it may also be driven by deeply sexist norms
that commodify women's bodies and a society that demands access to female
bodies.' 31 And such access or denials of access are embedded within state
regulation of subjects. 132 Certainly the demand for access to women's bodies has
a sordid colonial history, as Joan Wallach Scott has described in her work on the
French veil ban. 133 Colonial powers deployed the unveiling of women as a tactic
of control and subordination. 134 With such a history, the modem French laws
seem more a continuation of a colonial past than commitments to secularism. As
a counterpoint, mandates to veil in countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and
Afghanistan deprive women of choice and are, among other things, continuations
125. See Mariam Gomaa, American Hijab: Why My Scarf is a Sociopolitical Statement, Not a
Symbol of My Religiosity, TIME (Nov. 11, 2014), http://time.com/3576827/american-hijab-
scarf-sociopolitical-statement-religion/.
126. See JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, POLITICS OF THE VEIL 151-74 (2010); Wing & Smith, supra
note 124, at 767.
127. See KUMAR, supra note 87, at 42-44.
128. Nesiah, supra note 123, at 32.
129. See Wing & Smith, supra note 124, at 766.
130. See Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Hiyab and Choice: Between Politics and Theology, in INNOVATIONS
IN ISLAM: TRADITIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 190-212 (Mehran Kamrava ed., 2011).
131. See ScoTT, supra note 126, at 87-88. In the United States, the pornography debate and its
effects on women is an example. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 321, 326 (1984).
132. See Mir-Hosseini, supra note 130.
133. See SCOTT, supra note 126, at 45-50.
134. Id.
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of the policing of female sexuality and female presence in the public sphere.
Even in states where negative liberties protect "choices" to be seen or not
seen, autonomy and agency are only comprehensible as fragmented and partial
within a broader context of the dominant social norms. 135 Even a cursory
examination of the porn, diet, and fashion industries throws up contradictions
about "freedom" and choice.' 36 It seems as though liberal feminists espousing
beliefs about autonomy are willing to indulge themselves in the fantasy of
choice, refusing to unpack the many layers of influence that make up subjectivity
and inform choice, rather than confront the structural impediments to freedom. 137
Like women in liberal societies, there are a variety of pressures on Muslim
women whether in liberal or repressive societies. It is too simplistic to place
Muslim women primarily or only at the mercy of their religious norms. And it is
similarly disingenuous to assume that religion and culture do not exert pressures
on non-Muslim women. Furthermore, even if women's constraints come from
different sources, they may have similar results. A freely choosing subject and an
ideal consumer can be shaped by the needs of capitalism and the economy. Is it
really a free choice to dramatically alter one's appearance because a certain
industry elevates a specific norm of beauty? Women "choose" to undergo costly
and brutal forms of plastic surgery or to starve to meet dangerous standards of
beauty. Billions are spent on beauty and diet products that are known not to
work, providing large profits for corporations that take advantage of coercive
cultural norms of physical appearance. 138 Does this consumption, and the
industries that create the need for it, reflect women's freedom? The fact that
some women get pleasure and satisfaction from wearing makeup and walking in
four-inch heels is not disputed here. 139 However, the provenance of these choices
ought to be interrogated more thoroughly because they reflect the gender norms
that dominate every beauty magazine. 140
Ultimately, the decisions about how to live as a woman-whether
consciously made or not-are bound up in a complex web of formal laws,
societal norms, and personal motivations. 1 41 Moreover, context matters. It is one
thing to be speaking about women who live in states that enforce particular dress
codes (like France and Saudi Arabia where choice is constrained by state power),
135. See WENDY BROWN, REGULATING AVERSION: TOLERANCE IN THE AGE OF IDENTITY AND
EMPIRE 48-77, 189-99 (2008).
136. See generally SHEILA JEFFREYS, BEAUTY AND MISOGYNY: HARMFUL CULTURAL
PRACTICES IN THE WEST (2005) (analyzing the negative effects and profitability of the diet,
porn, and fashion industries in the West).
137. See BROWN, supra note 135, at 189-99.
138. Id.
139. See Meg Gehrke, Is Beauty the Beast?, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 221, 248
(1994).
140. See KATHLEEN WOODWARD, FIGURING AGE: WOMEN, BODIES, GENERATIONS 43-46
(1999).
141. See generally Cecil VanDevender, How Self-Restriction Laws Can Influence Societal Norms
and Address Problems of Bounded Rationality, 96 GEO. L.J. 1775 (2008) (explaining how
self-restriction laws can constrain individual behavior and influence the values of society).
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and another to be speaking about women in the United States who might be
housewives, college students, scientists, or porn stars, but whose choices are
driven more subtly by institutions that are not necessarily evident. To assert
simplistically that Muslim women who wear the veil suffer from false
consciousness and to construe their choice to dress modestly as a symbol of
gender oppression is to miss the complexity of their lives and the relationships
between individual, society, religion, and state. 142 Many feminists continue to
point out the shifting parameters of this debate, calling for more nuance than is
typically available in the public discourse. 143 Undoubtedly, the discussions about
the veil will continue to include challenges to the reductionist accounts of
Muslim women and the thin conceptualizations of autonomy and agency that are
cast as feminist values.
B. Authority: Who Gets to Speak?
The second locus of tension in discussions of feminism and difference is
the authority to speak. In the War on Terror era, there has been a multiplicity of
voices attempting to represent Muslims, and the population of experts on Islam
has burgeoned. 144 In this throng, a subset of women has emerged as dissident
voices who have then been elevated to prominence by mainstream media and by
many liberal feminists as well. 145 These women have captured the public
imagination because they are able to reflect the dominant narratives of
Islamophobia that have circulated from even before the attacks of September 11,
2001, while seemingly evincing a concern for women and equality.' 
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There are two kinds of spokeswomen-become-activists that require some
scrutiny. First, there are those who purport to provide an authoritative insider
account of the "Islamic" oppression of women and its causes. Ayaan Hirsi Ali
and Irshad Manji are examples. 147 Second, there are activists who, from an
outsider perspective, assert the ability to articulate subordination on behalf of
Muslim women because they have also faced similar gender subordination and
know what it looks like. FEMEN is a recent example of this category of
activists. 14 Both the insider account and the outsider account dismiss the
142. See Aliah Abdo, The Legal Status of Hilab in the United States: A Look at the Sociopolitical
Influences on the Legal Right to Wear the Muslim Headscarf, 5 HASTINGS RACE &
POVERTY L.J. 441,446 (2008).
143. See e.g., Narayan, supra note 70; Nesiah, supra note 123.
144. MUSLIM PUB. AFFAIRS COUNCIL, NOT QUALIFIED: EXPOSING THE DECEPTION BEHIND
AMERICA'S TOP 25 PSEUDO EXPERTS ON ISLAM, available at
http://www.mpac.org/assets/docs/publications/MPAC-25-Pseudo-Experts-On-Islam.pdf (last
visited Mar. 15, 2015).
145. See Lasson, supra note 85, at 434-35.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., ALI, supra note 115; IRSHAD MANJI, THE TROUBLE WITH ISLAM TODAY: A
MUSLIM'S CALL FOR REFORM IN HER FAITH (2004).
148. See, e.g., FEMEN Is Collecting Donations, FEMEN (June 13, 2013),
http://femen.org/news/id/425#post-content.
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heterogeneity of Muslim voices articulating sometimes overlapping and
sometimes discordant accounts of being Muslim women and the role of religion
in subordination. In the War on Terror era, the authority to speak about Islam
and women has been assumed by activists and intellectuals who reinforce the
dominant narratives about the "problem" of Islam. 149
In her book, Do Muslim Women Need Saving?, Lila Abu-Lughod explores
a genre of autobiographical writing that recounts the abuse experienced by the
authors growing up in a patriarchal Muslim family. 150 Combining lurid details
and eroticism with violence and abuse, these accounts provide a formulaic
arrangement of characters that women in the West can relate to easily. 151 Abu-
Lughod notes in her survey of the genre that these authors repeatedly employ sex
and force, from child abuse to marital rape, in a way that is pornographic.15
2
Moreover, the villain is the observant Muslim male and it is religious mania that
drives his violence and desire. Religious women in the narratives are mute and
subordinated, acquiescing to the violence perpetrated by the men. The victim
who eventually triumphs is rebellious and unwilling to be put down.
Here we can see most clearly how these memoirs are meant to inspire horror
and pity, followed by admiration for the heroine survivors' escape to freedom.
Freedom means escaping not just the Muslim men who torment them by their
own communities and cultures. The memoirists confess their rage, self-
loathing, and suicide attempts; they often describe themselves as having been
rebellious teenagers. This is the feminist difference of the late twentieth
century and into the twenty-first, where brown women seem to want to be
rescued by their white sisters and friends, to adapt Spivak's famous
formulation. If these Muslim girls and women were not portrayed as wanting
what we want-love, choice, and sexual freedom (even Christianity or
atheism.. .)-preferring instead to be dutiful daughters living in the bosom of
their families, virgins at marriage, devoted wives partnering with their
husbands, or pious individuals seeking to live up to the moral ideals of their
religion and living according to its laws, it would be hard for Western readers
to identify. 153
By wanting what "we" want and sharing our ideals of a good life, these
victim-survivors tell us all that is wrong with Islam and Muslim men and make
themselves legible as sisters in a common fight against patriarchy. Mukhtaran
Mai, Malala, and Ayaan Hirsi Ali, among others, are authorized to speak for
Muslim women generally and to reaffirm the common understanding of Islam as
149. Hossein Esmaeili, On A Slow Boat Towards the Rule of Law: The Nature of Law in the Saudi
Arabian Legal System, 26 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 36 (2009).
150. LILA ABU-LUGHOD, Do MUSLIM WOMEN NEED SAvING? 113-42 (2014).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 101.
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a brutally oppressive religion-as long as what they say follows the script.'
54
These stories combine with the constant terror of Islamist politics to make the
narrative that supports Islamophobia nearly seamless. 155 Drawing on this
common sense, in the legal context, a well-known defense strategy has been to
deploy an explanation of violence using culture or religion as though the
violence in question is not a crime in Islam or is commonly sanctioned and
accepted. Attempts to articulate different accounts of the violence or to point out
that these are indeed crimes under dominant interpretations of Islam may then be
dismissed as apology from Muslims or even "identity politics."'
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While activists like Manji and Ali assert special knowledge based on their
experiences inside Muslim families and communities, insider knowledge is not
necessary in order for activists to "know" that gender oppression is taking place
or what to do about it.157 Further, women who share certain histories, such as
belonging to previously colonized states, invasion, or dislocation, can assert
these experiences and histories as "shared."' 158 FEMEN claims to evade the
difficulties created by colonial history between Liberal European women and
women in the Global South because, as Eastern Europeans, women in FEMEN
were also "colonized." ' 159 Without arguing about the accuracy of such a
characterization, equating several hundred years of political subordination and
economic exploitation justified by civilizational and racial superiority with the
oppression of Communism and Soviet control is unsupportable. Further, a shared
experience of oppression cannot be abstracted from its particulars and used
unproblematically to form the basis of knowledge about another group in another
context. Such easy generalizations and universalizations of particular viewpoints
epistemologically privilege some feminists and allow for an assumption of
understanding. Moreover, such claims to knowledge obscure the privilege and
power that dominant feminist groups have to shape the debate.
154. See Marie Brenner, The Target, VANITY FAIR (Apr. 2013),
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/2013/04/malala-yousafzai-pakistan-profile. It should be
noted that there are significant differences among these now-famous Muslim women. Some
have left Islam while others consider themselves faithful Muslims.
155. See Sonali Kolhatkar, The Impact of U.S. Intervention on Afghan Women's Rights, 17
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 12, 17 (2002).
156. See Jeffrey Taylor, Reza Asian's Atheism Problem: "Fundamentalist" Atheists Aren't the
Issue, Apologists for Religions Are, SALON (Oct. 25, 2014, 7:00 AM),
http://www.salon.com/2014/10/25/rezaaslans atheismjproblem fundamentalist atheists ar
ent the issue apologists for religions are. Indeed, from Mr. Taylor's article it is hard to
imagine any nuanced discussion of Islam that is not reducible to an "apology" simply
because it disagrees with his agenda.
157. See ALl, supra note 115, at ix-x; MANJI, supra note 147, at 1-26 (describing how she
became a Muslim "refusenik").
158. See Bim Adewunmi, Sexualized Femen Protest "Naive and Foolish at Best," CNN (Apr. 22,
2013, 11:25 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/22/opinion/opinion-bim-adewumni-femen.
159. See Agata Pyzik, White Does Not Always Mean Privileged: Why Femen 's Ukrainian Context




Like some feminist groups in France and the United States, FEMEN has
shown that it presumes to know what is wrong in women's lives in the Global
South because FEMEN women have also been oppressed. 160 They have come to
understand women's subordination from Saudi Arabia to Senegal, and it boils
down to religion. 161 And they have also figured out how to free everyone from
this oppression. 162 Their totalizing judgments are not restricted to the disease but
also include the cure. In other words, FEMEN and its ilk not only want women
to be free, they also want to be able to dictate to women-regardless of where
they are and what webs of relationships inform their lives-how that freedom is
to be experienced. For a good dose of this stance, one need only visit FEMEN's
website, which states the following:
Dear FEMEN friends! As you are already aware, the repressive Tunisian Court
tossed in jail our peaceful activists Pauline, Margarit and Josephine. The three
heroes, who dared to protest topless in the Islamist dictatorship, got a prison
sentence of 4 months. They helped their companion Amina which were [sic]
arrested early, and now they need our protection and support! We are
collecting donations for next immediate and urgent actions: legal proceedings
to the appeal and release the girls; [list omitted]; drive public campaign against
official Tunisian authorities to pressure and discredit Islamists, who has [sic]
ignored generally accepted norms of democracy and freedom! These four girls
are early birds of upcoming female Arab revolution, women struggling for the
East liberty and civilized standards ofpersonalfreedom and human rights. 163
We may be able to write off FEMEN as a spectacle rather than a valid
political movement because of its use of nudity, but its activism underscores the
polarization between universal rights and the liberal ideas of civilization and
progress that are embedded in those rights, on the one hand, and a "regressive"
culture, on the other. It also points specifically to the tension between liberal
feminism in its governmentalist/imperialist form (we will tell you how to be
free), and real women's messy, lived experiences and alternative desires (we will
articulate for ourselves what it means to be free). FEMEN continues to wage its
gender jihad against what it calls "Islamists" without offering even a modicum of
comprehension of the heterogeneity within Muslim societies, any sensitivity
160. See FEMEN Is Collecting Donations, supra note 148.
161. Id.
162. See Jeffrey Taylor, Topless Jihad." Why Femen is Right, ATLANTIC (May 1, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/intemational/archive/2013/05/topless-jihad-why-femen-is-
right/275471/. Taylor reduces the problem of gender inequality to a simple matter of right
and wrong tactics or beliefs. The founder of FEMEN herself provides ample evidence of this
kind of reductionist and, indeed, supremacist viewpoint: "We demand human rights for all
women, for Arab women and American women .... The idea of a Muslim feminist is
oxymoronic." Id. (emphasis added). Unfortunately, it does not seem clear to either Taylor or
Shevchenko that forcing their idea of liberation on women is also oxymoronic, among its
other faults.
163. FEMEN Is Collecting Donations, supra note 148 (emphasis added).
BERKELEY JOURNAL OF GENDER, LAW & JUSTICE
toward the importance of religion in the fabric of the societies FEMEN hopes to
change, or an understanding of the ways in which FEMEN's activism might
have real consequences for women working to advance their status through other
strategies. A well-known feminist, Maya Jribi, articulates the problem quite
clearly in an interview with Rania Salloum:
"We in Tunisia have a different cultural and political context than in
Germany," says Jribi. "Here, Islamists try to explain women's issues in terms
of identity politics." The 'emancipated woman' is a concept of the permissive,
debauched West, she says, and it doesn't work in Tunisia. "We Tunisian
feminists are trying to steer the discussion away from identity. Women's rights
are a social and political issue," says Jribi. 164
The topless jihad plays right into this trope of the debauched, permissive
West and undermines much of the work done by local groups. This is not to say
that Tunisian feminists who decry FEMEN represent all Tunisian women, but it
does raise the question of who gets to speak and be heard and which means are
used to achieve the ends. Should the priority not be given to Tunisian feminists
to articulate the parameters of solidarity and to demonstrate the best means for
securing gender justice? FEMEN may have partnered with some Tunisian
women, but it clearly set the agenda and dictated the means of a topless
demonstration that is its signature. 165
V. ON LAYING DOWN THE CULTURAL BURDEN, TAKING DIFFERENCE
SERIOUSLY, AND NOT BECOMING IMPERIALIST TOOLS
Much of the thinking regarding the role of culture and religion as it
interacts with liberal rights-oriented law comes from those scholars who are
working in societies with minorities demanding accommodation and
recognition. 166 The question of adherence to universal human rights and
religion/culture that occurs in the global context presents quite a different
problem. Within majority liberal cultures, background norms and values are
already in place. Immigrant minorities in particular are in the position of trying
to convince the majority to cede rights and recognition that will allow some
differences in communities to be acceptable. To do so, they can use a democratic
164. Raniah Salloum, Tunisian Feminist Leader: 'Femen, Please Leave Us Alone,' SPIEGEL
ONLINE (June 13, 2013, 6:09 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/tunisian-
feminist-leader-criticizes-topless-femen-activists-a-905603.html.
165. Id.
166. See generally PHILLIPS, supra note 58 (arguing that it is possible to have multiculturalism
without protecting illiberal cultures); AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS:
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS (2001) (rejecting prevalent solutions to the
paradox of multicultural vulnerability and arguing for minority autonomy that is sensitive to
intragroup subordination); SARAH SONG, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF
MULTICULTURALISM (2007) (arguing that egalitarian justice must accommodate culture
while remaining committed to gender justice).
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process; indeed, some scholars have asserted that accommodation should be
balanced against the rights of all individuals to participate in the political process
and against the right to dissent and be represented. 167 Minority culture or religion
is pitted against democratic rights with a majority culture already firmly in
place. 68 As such, minorities are required to integrate to some degree. 169 Liberal
feminists in such contexts have to be sensitive to who their chief allies are in the
struggle for gender justice. For instance, taking the veil case in France, the
question arises whether liberal feminists, who assumed the meaning of the hijab
through an assumption of epistemological superiority, were acting to consolidate
their own power vis-A-vis the state and their position in the dominant culture or
whether they were truly trying to distribute power to their "oppressed" Muslim
sisters. 170 Certainly, the rhetoric and tactics used by some organizations raise
questions of whether there were sufficient attempts to build solidarity or
coalitions across difference. 171
Feminists in multicultural societies cannot solve the global problem of
gender inequality if they continue to be blind to their own privilege. They cannot
assume that the issues of culture that exist within their own state can be
generalized to the global system. In multicultural societies, liberal feminists are
part of a majority that is already constituted as the authority, wielding legal,
political, and epistemological power.172 The liberal solutions for the "problem"
of multiculturalism-consisting mostly of encouraging "tolerance" and
"accommodation"-are laudable, but as Wendy Brown points out, these
strategies work to maintain the hegemonic position of liberal feminists in each
solution instead of democratically distributing power. 1
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This is not to say that liberal feminists cannot engage in debate about the
gender issues raised by Islam and other cultures or support international action to
improve women's status merely because they do not belong to these
communities or countries. Nor are they foreclosed from doing so by dint of their
adherence to liberal values. But when these feminists intervene from a position
that celebrates and elevates their "outsideness," a position of such moral and
tutelary authority as to comparatively diminish their own cultural and gender
problems at the expense of the subjects of their critique, liberal feminists' actions
can be read as humiliating and subordinating-decidedly "unfeminist."
Moreover, they cannot intervene as the voice of "women," as though the liberal,
universalist feminist, speaking from an Archimedean point, represents an entire
category of gender fabricated based on an increasingly contested biological
167. See supra note 166; Mark D. Rosen, "Illiberal" Societal Cultures, Liberalism, and American
Constitutionalism, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803, 808 (2002).
168. See PHILLIPS, supra note 58.
169. ld. at21-22.
170. See SCOTr, supra note 126.
171. See Salloum, supra note 164.
172. See generally PHILLIPS, supra note 58.
173. See BROWN, supra note 135, at 189-99.
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sameness. 174 And certainly, feminists who belong to the elite, politically
dominant groups or nations should not have an uncontested epistemological
power to define the limits of cultural and religious accommodation domestically.
Nor should they be able to call for state-led military violence towards vulnerable
populations as a means of achieving their feminist goals, as some liberal
feminists have done under the guise of humanitarianism.'
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What then can be done to build bridges between groups of women from
vastly different contexts? In a documentary on Afghanistan, ordinary women
protesting the passage of a gender-biased rape law expressed that women of the
world must be united. 76 Quite apart from the sophisticated critiques of gender
that have become commonplace in academia, these women recognize that their
subordination comes from a basic gender difference that sets them apart from
men. 177 Yet at the same time, while calling for solidarity, they eschew foreign
intervention. 178 Moreover, they do not necessarily see their oppression as being
rooted in their religion (although certainly they recognize culture as something to
be changed). 179
These women's observations and comments reflect three critical
requirements that move us forward toward greater gender justice for women
globally. First, they acknowledge their difference from women in other contexts
even while also asserting their sameness. They demonstrate that there are
different ways of being a woman and that essentialist views that elevate some
experiences over others, or that overstate gender versus religion and race, can
come to be oppressive, much as Kimberl6 Crenshaw has theorized. 180 Women in
the Global South-the part of the world where culture is supposedly
problematic-do not necessarily experience the matrix of cultural, religious, and
gender norms as uniformly problematic. As Saba Mahmood has shown in her
work on the Egyptian piety movement, women are agents of a new form of
Islamic piety that includes reading sacred texts for themselves and interpreting
religion. 181 They are not simply living out the requirements of men. 182 Religion
174. See, e.g., BUTLER, supra note 111; RILEY, supra note 11.
175. Catharine MacKinnon, Women's September 11th: Rethinking the International Law of
Conflict, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 22 (2006). But see Karen Engle, "Calling in the Troops":
The Uneasy Relationship Among Women 's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian
Intervention, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 189, 190 (2007) (cautioning against the use of force to
secure women's rights).
176. See Robert Greenwald & Brave New Foundation, Rethink Afghnaistan Part 5: Women of
Afghanistan, YOUTUBE (July, 7 2009), http://youtu.be/R7jATOFAGBc.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179 LINA ABIRAFEH, GENDER AND INTERNATIONAL AID IN AFGHANISTAN: THE POLITICS AND
EFFECTS OF INTERVENTION 91 (2009).
180. See Crenshaw, supra note 25.




is an important part of these women's identities.183 Furthermore, progress itself
is conceived of within an Islamic framework such that ideas of progress that
include the shedding of religious adherence are unappealing. 184 Even if we are
skeptical of "Islamic feminism," Muslim women are taking the initiative in
theorizing and building a form of feminism that demands rights for women while
remaining solidly within the religious framework of Islam.185 Such activism
provides an opportunity to create solidarity and advance women's well-being
with women similarly committed.
Many Muslim women are unwilling to take a one-sided approach choosing
between apologists/relativists and universalists: rather, they maintain that culture
and religion are open to interpretation, contestation, and reformulation. This
brings me to the second point of recognizing dissent. Just as theorists from Mary
Wollstonecraft to Gloria Steinem built on liberal philosophy, expanding it and
pushing society to accept gender-inclusive interpretations of rights, Muslim
women are doing the same with Islam. 186 They are articulating a very important
critique of how Islam has been interpreted. These women and men present a
vibrant dissent from traditionalist positions and challenge their subordinations
from within their communities. Is it necessary for them to exit these
communities in order to advance gender justice? Should women and men
abandon this "irrational" attachment to patriarchal culture? Fighting the battle on
religious grounds and from within produces a sort of liberal bafflement for many
outsider women who cannot understand why anyone would want to partake of a
183. Id. at 1-5.
184. For examples of Islamic feminism, see MARGOT BADRAN, FEMINISM IN ISLAM:
SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS CONVERGENCES (2009); MIRIAM COOKE, WOMEN CLAIM
ISLAM: CREATING ISLAMIC FEMINISM THROUGH LITERATURE (2000); ELIZABETH
WARNOCK FERNEA, IN SEARCH OF ISLAMIC FEMINISM (2010); SHERINE HAFEZ, AN
ISLAM OF HER OWN: RECONSIDERING RELIGION AND SECULARISM IN WOMEN'S
ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS (2011); MAI YAMANI, FEMINISM AND ISLAM: LEGAL AND
LITERARY PERSPECTIVES (1996). To expect that the only way that Muslim women can
actually attain rights or equality is by leaving Islam altogether-as some atheist, ex-
Muslim feminists seem to suggest-is to reflect the same binary thinking as right-wing
Islamophobes. By that token, the only women able to pursue equality and rights are
those who profess no religion. Extending that argument, one could also assert that
such women would have to disavow any cultural attachments as most societies remain
to a degree patriarchal. The end point of such a position is radical separatism.
Certainly, atheist women have every right to challenge Islamic feminism or any other
variant, but when those challenges are based on the view that patriarchal religions
cannot be reformed, the arguments begin to merge with right-wing narratives that are
often racist and Islamophobic. For examples of women leaving Islam, see Max
Oppenheimer, Leaving Islam for Atheism, and Finding a Much-Needed Place Among
Peers, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/24/us/leaving-
islam-for-atheism-and-finding-a-much-needed-place-among-peers.html.
185. See, e.g., BADRAN, supra note 184; FERNEA, supra note 184.
186. See generally ASMA BARLAS, BELIEVING WOMEN IN ISLAM: UNREADING PATRIARCHAL
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE QUR'AN (2002) (arguing that the dominant interpretations of the
Qur'an are unnecessarily gender-biased); AMINA WADUD, QUR'AN AND WOMAN:
REREADING THE SACRED TEXT FROM A WOMAN'S PERSPECTIVE (1999) (providing a gender-
equal reading of the Qur'an).
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religion that oppresses them. 87 But for religious believers, faith is not something
to be chosen as part of an individualistic liberal persona. 88 Conscious choice to
believe or not believe may not even be understood as a possibility and this is
particularly true for subaltern women in rural communities. Those women, for
whom feminists purportedly work, may not have a choice of exit, but may
nevertheless be invested in the betterment of their own lot and that of their
daughters. Moreover, I would venture to say that women do not experience Islam
as uniformly oppressive but rather find comfort in its ritual practices and
beliefs-this is no different from any other belief system. 8 9 Rather than
encouraging exit, feminist allies can support religious feminists even while being
skeptical and offering critiques of their positions. Solidarity with ordinary
women who practice Islam but are not part of a restrictive and patriarchal
Islamist movement is becoming increasingly important. In contexts like Pakistan
and Turkey, where traditionalists and right-wing Islamic leaders are increasingly
seeking to curtail the rights of women, it is important to make distinctions
between right-wing women who support these efforts and Muslim women who,
even if not self-avowedly feminist, resist them. 190 In other words, a feminism
that requires Muslim women to give up Islam entirely provides very little ground
upon which to build coalitions or solidarity and is unlikely to have much
purchase in the majority of Muslim communities, wherever they may be found.
Finally, the third requirement for building these bridges is an active
renunciation of epistemological and civilizational superiority in favor of
solidarity. Most women in the Global South live in societies that still bear the
scars of colonialism and Western imperialism. Women from colonizing countries
were active participants in subjecting native populations to colonial discipline. '91
Even now, the term memsahib (white mistress) is used derogatorily to describe
someone who thinks herself very superior.' 92 In the United States, Southern
white women were pitted against slave women because they were the direct
beneficiaries of slave labor.193 Structural relationships of oppressor/oppressed in
colonial and slave times continue to haunt our ability to form coalitions to
187. Seval Yildirim, Global Tangles: Laws, Headcoverings And Religious Identity, 10 SANTA
CLARA J. INT'L L. 45, 51 (2012).
188. See RELATIONAL AUTONOMY, supra note 122, at 33.
189. See supra notes 184 and 187 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Sarah EI-Rashidi, Egyptian Women Campaign for Larger Role in Parliament, AL-
MONITOR (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/O4/egypt-
women-dostour-parliament-rights.html (last visited Jan 18, 2015); Local Government Polls:
Empowering Women at the Grass-roots, EXPRESS TRIB. (Feb. 19, 2014),
http://tribune.com.pk/story/67345 I local-govemment-polls-empowering-women-at-the-
grass-roots/.
191. See MARGARET MACMILLAN, WOMEN OF THE RAJ: THE MOTHERS, WIVES, AND
DAUGHTERS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA xviii, 161 (2007).
192. GEORGE ORWELL, BURMESE DAYS 69 (Harcourt Brace 1962).
193. DEBORAH GRAY WHITE, AR'N'T I A WOMAN?: FEMALE SLAVES IN THE PLANTATION
SOUTH 7 (1999).
BEYOND CULTURE
combat sexism and gender oppression.' 94 The practice of solidarity becomes
harder when those who already bear the history of privilege take the position of
"knowing what's best" or setting the priorities for women in the Global South.
Perhaps unwittingly, that positioning invokes and revives the specter of colonial
oppression, the white privilege of the antebellum South and Jim Crow. 195 In
order for women to overcome these divides, there must be equality within and
among communities of women and respect for difference-not mere tolerance of
it from a position of hegemony. This requires those with histories of class, race,
and geographic privilege to actively renounce those unearned benefits in order to
fully engage at an equal level. By carefully listening, respecting difference,
elevating the voices of those who are subordinated, and acknowledging their
own advantages, feminists who enjoy privilege can work to level the playing
field even while they engage in vigorous and informed debate or challenge
patriarchal Islamists or Islam.
Recognizing and repudiating positional privilege, acknowledging the
cultural content of seemingly neutral positions, and being sensitive to the ways
in which gender issues can be co-opted by an imperial state in its efforts at
maintaining power are critical to forging better transnational solidarities. While
there is much to be learned from liberal democracies that are struggling with
cultural and religious pluralism, it is important to remember that such societies
are not necessarily redistributing power through multicultural
accommodations. 196 They are tolerating the "Other." They are managing
populations. 197 The structural inequalities between communities remain and can
even be exacerbated through multicultural politics. 198 Uneven distributions of
power are also in place on a global level, and the use of human rights and other
international norms are used similarly but with a critical difference:
disagreements can play out both among states and internal heterogeneous
populations. Resistance from undemocratic leaders can prevent human rights
norms from taking root, and culturally and religiously different populations may
also resist, reinterpret, and transform these norms locally. 199 It is difficult to
impose these norms from outside. For transnational gender activists, the terrain
becomes particularly difficult if they attempt to push change from a
condescending position.
194. See CHANDRA TALPADE MOHANTY, FEMINISM WITHOUT BORDERS: DECOLONIZING
THEORY, PRACTICING SOLIDARITY 18-20 (2003).
195. Id.
196. See BROWN, supra note 135, at 37.
197. See id. at 93.
198. See id.
199. See generally Choudhury, supra note 22 (describing differences in conceptions of human
rights that exist at local levels).
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CONCLUSION
The ongoing stalemate between a universalist, liberal feminism and an
immutable cultural patriarchy has led to a great deal of energy lost that might
have been better used to promote gender justice. Take the example of FEMEN:
an approach other than baring breasts with anti-Islamic slogans written on
activists' bodies might have generated less conversation about what Muslim
women wear on their heads, might not have provoked a counter response with
Muslim women telling FEMEN that they were not in need of instruction on their
emancipatory goals, and it certainly would have generated far fewer front-
page media stories. The spectacle of the protest raises questions about the
movement's true motives.
If FEMEN activists had taken the time to actually talk to women's groups
working at the grassroots level, they might have understood what battles were
really relevant to the lives of women in Tunisia, a country in which they had
taken a particular interest, presumably because their colleague Amina Tyler and
three others were jailed for protesting topless there. 20 If they had taken
difference seriously and had not continued-as they still do-with the
assumption that "we" all want the same thing, and that the same forces operate in
each context, the stalemate might have been broken. Rather than requesting
monetary donations to bail out their colleagues for a topless protest that most
certainly increased FEMEN's notoriety and benefited its activists, those
resources might have gone toward improving the lives of Tunisian women.
2 0 2
FEMEN, of course, does not reflect the vast majority of women's rights groups
that are working transnationally. Its own position of superiority is so exaggerated
that FEMEN becomes easy to dismiss, undoubtedly making it an extreme
example. But it is also a useful one because many activist groups harbor similar
positions, which-although more sophisticatedly packaged-are, at heart,
equally condescending to local cultures.
Liberal feminism need not abandon its commitments to equality and human
rights. But it must compete in the marketplace of ideas alongside other
articulations of women's flourishing without tying into the colonial narratives of
supremacy. If it wants to be relevant to the lives of women beyond the
Westernized elite, it will have to take difference seriously and translate its ideas
into ones that appeal broadly. It cannot rely on its hegemonic political position or
superior knowledge. Liberal ideas have to deliver the goods. Secular, liberal
feminists will have to compete on the terrain of politics, and, in order to succeed
200. Uzma Kolsy, Put Your Shirts Back On: Why Femen Is Wrong, ATLANTIC (May 6, 2013, 3:20
PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/internationa/archive/2013/05/put-your-shirts-back-on-
why-femen-is-wrong/275582/.
201. See Milene Larsson, We Spoke To Femen About Their Topless Tunisian Protest, VICE (May
30, 2013), http://www.vice.com/read/femen-first-topless-protest-arab-world-tunisia-amina-
taylor.
202. See Donate, FEMEN, http://femen.org/help?attempt-1 (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
BEYOND CULTURE
in bettering women's lives, they will have to partner more effectively with local
groups on terms of equality. Women in the Global South will also have to
203
eschew an identity politics that undercuts gains in gender justice. To do this,
all of us will have to stop wielding simplistic cultural explanations that mirror
those of traditionalists; we will have to disavow the easy judgmental attitude that
pervades many feminist observations of the plight of the Global South or the
Global North; and we will have to work toward real solidarity by actively
valuing the experiences and desires of others. A feminist politics of democratic
solidarity requires women on all sides to acknowledge that people will express
their freedom differently in different political contexts and to use that pluralism
as a strength rather than continuing to suffer it as a weakness.
203. See NANCY FRASER, SCALES OF JUSTICE: REIMAGINING POLITICAL SPACE IN A
GLOBALIZING WORLD 100-15 (2010).
